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CHAPTER I
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT--AN OVERVIEW
Introduction
The Principle of Double Effect has served as a guide for both
statesmen and soldiers since the middle ages in determining which
acts in war are morally permissible and which are not. It is used,
in particular, by those who make their moral decisions on the basis
of certain moral rules that concern the moral consequences of action.
This Principle of Double Effect (hereafter referred to as PDE) comes
into play in situations where an agent has the option of performing
an act with both good and bad consequences. Advocates of PDE believe
that it is morally significant whether a bad consequence is intended
by the agent or merely forseen as incidental to an act that is in
all other respects morally acceptable.^ Of great interest to moral
philosophers discussing acts of war is how this principle applies
to the deaths of persons not directly involved in the prosecution
of the war. Proponents of the PDE claim that while it is morally
impermissible to intentionally bring about the deaths of innocent
people during combat, either as a means to a military objective or
as a goal in itself, it is permissible under certain circumstances
for an agent to choose a course of action which may bring about the
deaths of innocent people as a forseeable consequence.
In order to discuss this principle clearly it is perhaps a good
1
2idea to take a look at it now. One commonly accepted version of
this doctrine is that put forth by the Catholic Church. It looks
like this:
PDE: An agent is morally permitted to perform an act
which results in both good and bad consequences if
and only if (1) the act itself is morally good or at
least indifferent, (2) the agent does not positively
will (intend) the bad effect but merely permits it,
(3) the good effect flows from the action at least as
immediately as the bad effect, and (4) the good effect
is suf ficiently„desirable to compensate for allowing
the bad effect.
As I said earlier the PDE is a moral principle that has been developed
because deontological philosophers of a specific sort have recognized
that oftentimes there are situations where a particular act brings
3
about both good and bad consequences. They also have seen that the
moral rules they accept either give them conflicting guidance in the
matter or perhaps even give them guidance which seems to be intuitively
wrong.
Let's consider an example which presents the kind of problem the
PDE should be concerned with. Major Lee is in charge of a special
anti-terrorist unit which has been sent to rescue ten hostages being
held by a lone gunman. The gunman is holding the hostages in a local
office building and has threatened to shoot them all by a certain time
if his demands are not met. Because his demands are so ridiculously
exorbitant Major Lee's government refuses to negotiate with the terror-
ist. Lee moves his men into position and begins to consider the
alternatives open to him. If he storms the building, there is a very
3good chance that the terrorist will shoot most of the hostages before
he and his men can reach them. He does not have the assets to attempt
an aerial insertion onto the top of the building. One by one Lee con-
siders other alternatives and finds them unacceptable. He decides that
the best alternative is to position his expert marksmen in positions
where they can shoot the terrorist if he exposes himself. They then
begin their wait.
As time begins to run out the terrorist brings one of the hostages
to the window with him to demonstrate his willingness to carry out
the threat. He holds an automatic weapon to the head of a young man.
Major Lee seeing that the terrorist is about to shoot the hostage,
orders one of his marksmen to shoot the terrorist. In doing so, he
knows that even if the marksman shoots the terrorist, it is still
probable the terrorist will kill the one hostage before he dies.
Nonetheless, the nine other hostages will have been spared a similar
fate. Yet, all the same, it is both Major Lee's and the marksman's
intent to kill the terrorist, not the hostage. In fact, the sharp-
shooter does shoot the terrorist, but before the terrorist dies he
pulls the trigger of his gun and kills the hostage.
Now this might not seem like such a great problem to those of
the utilitarian persuasion. Solving the problem would seem to be
merely a matter of weighing the positive utility of the good effects
against the negative utility of the bad effects. If the overall
utility of doing that act is at least as great as that of any per-
4formable alternatives, then doing that particular act would be morally
permissible. In this case, it seems that no other viable alternatives
were open to Lee. Any other action he might take would probably bring
about the deaths of all ten of the hostages. However, the action that
he did choose only brought about the death of one hostage. Surely,
a utilitarian would say, it is much better that only one hostage die
than all ten.
However, for the deontologist who is likely to support the PDE,
this is not an acceptable means of solving the problem. The particular
type of normative ethical system he supposes correct would prevent him
from making such an overt appeal to utilitarian considerations.
Aquinas was one of the earliest proponents of this kind of system, as
well as the PDE. Since Aquinas' ethical system has been widely accept-
ed by many "Just War" theorists, we will examine it to understand better
why the PDE is a necessary part of it.
According to Aquinas, we as human beings are rational and have
free will. Moreover, as rational men, we perform our actions with
particular goals in mind. We do not act just to be acting, but
4
instead to be achieving some end or consequence. Accordingly our
actions should be judged not just in terms of the action itself, but
also in terms of achieving those consequences we acted to bring about.
Now while this theory is teleological (ends oriented) in nature, it is
not to be confused with utilitarianism. For under Aquinas' theory the
moral arbiter is concerned with specific moral rules. That is, not
5only must the act itself be intrinsically neutral or good but the
consequences of the act should be in accord with certain specific
moral rules that we men hold as binding. For the purposes of this
discussion we will assume that the rules that Aquinas had in mind are
the Commandments
.
An Aquinian deontologist might propose, then, that these Command-
ments should be couched in terms of specific consequences our acts
bring about. One example of such a rule might be:
A: One should not perform actions which bring about
the deaths of innocent people.
An action would be right or wrong with respect to this rule in terms
of its specific consequences (i.e., whether someone was killed or not),
rather than judged right or wrong in terms of the overall utility of
all the consequences it brings about, as a utilitarian would claim.
Now Aquinas did not just espouse rules which are prohibitory in nature.
He also thought we have a duty to perform actions which result in
beneficent consequences. Not only should we endeavor to prevent the
evil consequences that the ten Commandments prohibit, but we also
should promote good consequences by our actions. Let’s consider this
as an additional rule in our set of Commandments.
Now the problem with this moral system becomes evident if we
consider our example situation. If rule A applies, no action that
Major Lee is able to do is acceptable. Yet, this conclusion, as well
as being impracticable, runs counter to our basic moral intuitions.
Even if we apply our additional rule to act to bring about beneficent
6consequences, we run into a dilemma. For now Major Lee is enjoined
to save the nine but not to kill the one. Clearly, this is impossible
given the circumstances.
It seems that Aquinas recognized that the sort of conflicts 1
have just described were inevitable in a deontological system where
the rules are absolute in the way that rule A is. So, 1 think it is
safe to say that rules like A are not exactly what Aquinas had in mind.
Important to Aquinas's moral theory was the role the agent plays
in an action. In particular he was interested in how the agent con-
ceives his action and its consequences when he performs the action.
What seems to have concerned him was that not everything that occurs
to others as a consequence of one's action is something that one
deliberately does to those people. Absolute rules, such as A, did
not capture that intuition. One, for example, could be held account-
able for any killing that comes about as a consequence of one's action,
no matter how remote the consequence or how little control the agent
has in the action. Consequently, Aquinas designed the PDF to make a
distinction between consequences that are deliberately brought about
by the agent and those which are not.
It is important to note, however, that the PDF is not just another
rule that is tacked on to some absolutist deontological theory. That
is, it is not that there are 10 (or 11) Commandments and then the PDF.
5
For this does nothing to solve the dilemma produced by rules like A.
By applying the PDF in this manner, one just confuses the matter all
7the more. Using our terrorist scenario as an example, rule A tells
us that Major Lee's action is morally wrong (impermissible) while the
PDE would probably tell us Lee’s action is morally permissible. A
dilemma still exists.
Instead, we should think of the PDE as an integral part of each
rule in our moral system. It is not, for example, that all acts of
killing are wrong. Certain non-deliberate killings are excused. We
use the criteria of the PDE to determine which of these actions are
excused. One might best think of the PDE's role as something like a
caveat on each of the moral rules. Let's adjust rule A to see how
the PDE modifies it:
(A'): An action in which the agent brings about the deaths
of an innocent person is morally impermissible except
when (1) the act itself is not morally wrong, (2) At
least one good consequence is brought about by the act,
(3) the agent does not intend to bring about the death
of the innocent person, (4) the good consequence results
from the action at least as immediately as the death
of the innocent person, and (5) the good consequence is
sufficiently desirable to compensate for allowing the
death of the innocent person.
I think that it is safe to say here that the PDE is not just an
adjunct to an Aquinian deontologist ' s moral system, but an essential
part of each rule within that system. It allows that certain actions
which bring about bad consequences are morally permissible.
By applying rule A' now we are able to extricate Major Lee from
his dilemma. Allowing that the act of shooting a rifle is not morally
wrong. Major Lee's action fulfills the other four criteria of rule A'.
The good consequence brought about is that he rescues nine hostages.
8Neither Major Lee nor the marksman intends that the one hostage be
killed. Practically speaking, the one hostage's being killed results
at the same time as the other hostages' being freed. Clearly though,
it is not the death of the one hostage that brings about the saving
of the other nine. It is the death of the terrorist (who is not an
"innocent person") which brings about both consequences. Finally,
a good number of us would say that the saving of the nine hostages
is sufficiently desirable to compensate for the death of the one.
This is not to say that I do not recognize that there are those who
would disagree with me on this last point.
The Central Role of Intention in the PDF
The criterion that the agent should not intend the possible bad
effects of his action seems to me to be the foundation of the PDF.
We can better understand this intuition if we just pause a moment to
consider man's many limitations with respect to his intentions and
foreknowledge in the performance of his acts. Clearly, men often act
with the intention of adhering to moral prescriptions and with the
belief that they do. Yet, in the process of performing what they
believe is an act with good consequences they may unintentionally
violate some moral rule. Man is inherently limited by his beliefs
about what his acts entail, his perceptions of the circumstances that
they are performed in, and his physical capabilities. It is a rare
situation indeed, where an individual is aware of all the relevant
9circumstances that influence his action, all the relevant alternatives
open to him, and all the consequences that each alternative entails.
It is rarer still for him to see how these factors should be weighted
in order to reach the morally correct decision.
Because man is limited in these ways from objectively determining
what is right, he can rarely, if ever, be in the position to know with
absolute certainty that he is doing the morally right thing. Perhaps
realizing this, early deontologists expanded the criterion for a
morally permissible act to include the moral quality of the agent's
intentions in doing it, as well as the rightness or wrongness of the
act and its consequences.
It seems that this is what these men had in mind. Aquinas, among
others, clearly said that one's intention in doing an act has a direct
bearing on its moral quality. For instance, an agent's bad intention
will spoil a good act, but his good intentions will not redeem an act
that is known by him to be bad.^ The intuition was that if one
genuinely intended certain good consequences from an act and the act
in itself was not intrinsically bad, then the agent had not willingly
performed a sin and, hence, was not culpable, as one would be if one
had aimed for bad results. They reasoned, it is one thing knowingly
to attempt to bring about evil consequences and quite another thing
to bring about evil effects that are merely foreseeable as a possible
side effect (or not forseeable at all) of one's intended act.
It is critical to note here that great emphasis was placed upon
10
how the agent viewed the act he was about to perform. For example,
consider the case where John is practicing with his rifle on a range.
He is engaging pop-up silhouette targets at a distance of approximate-
ly 100 meters from him. Suppose he has been shooting at them for
quite awhile. In the meantime his best buddy, Greg, has gone down-
range to fix some of the targets that have not been working. Let's
assume that John does not know this. As Greg is working on one of the
targets he straightens up to stretch his sore back. John, mistaking
Greg for one of the silhouette targets, shoots and kills him instantly.
It is consistent with this early Christian ethical philosophy to say
that John did not intend Greg's death. His aim was to hit a silhouette
target, not to kill Greg. Hence, the moral status of the act is much
different than it would have been had he intended Greg's death when he
shot the rifle. In a sense John intended the act and in a sense did
not intend it. How John is judged revolves on his intent and his
knowledge of the act. The other criteria of the PDF, although perhaps
helpful, are ancillary. They are of help only after we have resolved
the question of the agent's intention in the matter.
The PDF is designed to help us in those cases where bad conse-
quences result from an action as well as good conseqeunces
,
even
though the agent intends only the good consequences. If the agent
truly envisions his act to have the good consequences he intends,
even though the bad consequences are foreseeable, then his act is
morally permissible (provided the other three criteria are met).
11
By applying the PDE to these cases, we add a subjective element.
It is not only important whether the agent's action produces a bad
consequence which in turn causes him to violate a moral rule. It
is also important whether the agent deliberately intends that his
action bring about those bad consequences.
The PDE and Just War Doctrine
The PDE, then is extremely important in Christian Just War theory,
as Aquinas well knew. He, as much as anyone, recognized that the
Christian religion is based upon living according to certain rules.
One general rule, stated as a strict deontologist (one who advocates
absolute rules like A) might, is that one should not act in a way
that will result in harm to other people; in particular one should
not destroy their property or kill them. It is readily apparent that
if one is fighting a war, it is particularly difficult to win without
doing some harm to one's fellow man. That is what war is all about.
Of course, the deontologist critic might immediately reply that
this only goes to show that all war is evil and, hence, no war should
ever be fought. Nonetheless, there are many deontologists
,
both past
and present, who have rejected that conclusion. Early Christian phi-
losophers, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, rejected the
view that all wars are evil, and hence morally wrong. ^ It was their
opinion that there are occasions when war can be justified.
Foremost among the conditions they supposed must be met in order
12
to fight a "just war" was that one's cause must be just.^ The prac-
tical problem with this criterion is fairly obvious. Typically, each
belligerent party in a war believes his own cause to be just: other-
wise he would not be fighting. To recognize our enemy as having a
just cause, while denying that our own cause is just, is to deny the
legitimacy of our fighting the enemy and hence the legitimacy of our
disputing the enemy's claim against us.^ As later just war theorists
discovered, this criterion is not suitable. Belligerent nations which
adhere to divergent ideologies and religions can be expected to believe
their own cause just according to their own ideological and religious
beliefs. More recent philosophers have, as a result, turned to a
different criterion to eliminate the problem mentioned above. They
generally agree that a nation fights justly only if the country they
are fighting committed an act of aggression against them first. That
is, wars may be fought only in self-defense.^^ While this criterion
also may be unequal to the task it is supposed to perform, it is
generally accepted today by most nations. This, however, is not to
say that they always act in accordance with it. Moreover, the question
of who has committed the first act of aggression is often itself in
dispute
.
What is important to remember here is that many philosophers
throughout history have believed that there are occasions when war is
justified. The early Christian philosophers, for example, felt that
there were surely some instances where one ought to go to war to
13
preserve Christianity" or to prevent some great evil that some other
country would perpetrate if it were not defeated by military force.
I think that the same kinds of reasons appeal to those philosophers
and statesmen today who think that war may be justified. Thus, if
one is a strict deontologist of the sort who would assert rules like
A and accepts the view that there are at least some instances, how~
ever few, in which war can be justified, then one had better be
prepared to account for those moral rules which are violated in
that war.
This is the problem that the early Christian thinkers were faced
with. On the one hand, Christian moral teachings required that one
ought to refrain from bringing about harm to his fellow man, while on
the other hand, he ought to bring about the destruction of the infidel
enemy, who fights unjustly. Early theologians such as Augustine and
Aquinas resolved part of this dilemma claiming that one's obligation
to defeat (even destroy) the enemy while fighting for one's own nation
took precedence over the obligation not to harm one's fellow man, but
only if the nation's cause was just.^^ "Just national causes" took
precedence over prohibitions on individual action. As a soldier of a
"just nation" the soldier fought for his sovereign and not merely for
himself. His killing of enemy soldiers contributed to the overall
good consequences of his nation's fighting a just war. Because it
contributed to these overall good consequences his action was thereby
permissible. Even so, the class of people he was allowed to harm
14
was limited. Generally speaking, war was the province of soldiers.
Soldiers by convention forfeited their right not to be harmed.
However, this was not the case for the remainder of the populace who
were not actively engaged in the fighting or directly supporting the
fighting.
The major problem that remained for these early just war theo~
rists was to account for those poor souls who were harmed as a side
result of the fighting yet who took no active part in it as a
belligerent for either side. To solve this problem these philoso-
phers developed the "Principle of Double Effect". Surely, they
argued, there are instances in which we are justified in attacking
some legitimate military objective; even at the expense of the lives
of some innocent civilians whose deaths we neither desire nor intend.
The PDE, then, was their way of reconciling the general prohibi-
tion against bringing harm to non-combatants with legitimate attacks
on an unjust enemy. Perhaps Suarez best summed up the views of these
early just war theorists on the subject of the PDE when he said:
For absolutely speaking whoever has the right to
attain the end sought by a war, has the right to
use these means to that end. Moreover, in such a
case, the death of the innocent is not sought for
its own sake, but is an incidental consequence;
hence, it is considered not as voluntarily in-
flicted but simply as allowed by one who is m^^ing
use of his right in a time of necessity . . .
There are several things implied by this statement. First,
there is an assumption that the fighting and winning of a particular
battle is a "morally good" act (or at least "morally neutral") and
15
necessary for the production of good consequences; such as winning
the "just" war. Secondly, the bad effects of killing the innocent
are sufficiently offset by the good effects of winning the battle and,
ultimately, the war. Third, the bad effects (the killing of innocent
persons) are not the causes of the good effects of winning the battle.
Both the good effects and the bad effects are caused by the act of
fighting and winning the battle. Finally, the soldier’s killing of
the innocent must be unintended even though that result might be a
foreseeable consequence of fighting the battle.
It seems, then, that Aquinas, Suarez and other just war theo-
rists have given the soldier a means to reconcile at least some of
the harm he may produce by his actions in war with the good that is
produced by some of those same actions
. The PDF appears to resolve
many of the moral dilemmas a soldier may be faced with in the course
of combat. He can justify the consequences of his action, (sometimes)
by an appeal to how he views his act and its consequences.
Thesis
In the last 30 years or so more and more philosophers have
taken issue with the PDF. They have felt that with the advent of
nuclear weapons and other weapons systems of immensely destructive
power, the PDF has been rendered inapposite. Donald Wells has ex-
pressed this view in the following way:
Modern weapons make such sensitivity about the
recipients of our missiles inoperable and un-
feasible. Not only this, but the number of non-
16
combatants killed in war far exceeds that of
soldiers. Whereas medieval man might pardonably
weep for the accidentally slain civilians, modern
man intends the death of every civilian slain
when he drops bombs from the air.^^
While it may have been a useful criterion in the past, they argue,
modern weapons are so devastating and indiscriminate in their killing
power that any attempt at justifying their use by means of the PDE
makes a mockery of moral discourse. They believe that if atomic war
should take place the world would be devastated, if not destroyed.
Not only would a large portion of the world's population be eradi-
cated, but also the planet might be made inhospitable to future
generations. Life as we know it would cease to exist.
The purpose of this paper is neither to attack nor support this
line of reasoning. I believe that the flaws in the PDE are much more
deeply rooted than in its inability to resolve cases concerning
nuclear weapons and the like. While I, as a soldier, have certain
beliefs about the use of nuclear weapons, I wish to keep these
attitudes apart from the discussion which will ensue. For 1 think
they are irrelevant in seeing just where the PDE goes wrong. In-
stead, I intend to take the stance that the PDE is not now, nor has
it ever been a useful guide for determining which action among per-
formable alternatives is morally permissible. It is not that the
"state of the art" of war has rendered the PDE obsolete. It is,
instead, that there are basic flaws in the theory itself which render
it ineffective. My strategy then, will be to show that not only is
17
the PDE not particularly useful in determining which course of action
open to the participants in a war is morally permissible, but that one
of its conditions is incurably ambiguous to the point of being inco-
herent. In doing this, I hope to show why any reformulation of the
doctrine is unhelpful.
In developing my thesis I will focus exclusively on the central
role that intention plays in this principle. The criterion that
employs the notion of intention is the one that I find most proble-
matic. While I believe that there are problems with other aspects of
the PDE, I will not pursue them in this paper.
I have chosen to discuss the curious role that intention plays
in this principle because of its apparent significance in a variety of
moral problems; not just those concerned with combat. This concept
of how intention plays a role in our moral evaluation of acts has
been accepted and used throughout much of the history of the Christian
church and the western world. Moreover, it has come to play an
increasingly significant role in the moral and legal affairs of our
culture in general. Certainly, our legal system reflects this trend.
Today, as much as ever, we consider very carefully what a moral agent's
intent (or motive) is in doing a wrong act before determining whether
he is "guilty" and, if so, how much guilt to ascribe to him. So, it
is important whether or not the PDE is a viable doctrine. In the
next few chapters I will attempt to show why I think this emphasis on
the agent is misguided, if not wrong. However, before discussing
18
the role of intention in the PDE, I think it best to give some of my
basic assumptions with regard to the PDE and "Just War" doctrine,
in general.
Some Basic Assumptions
First of all, I want to assume that in all likelihood wars will
continue to occur in one form or another. My concern in this paper
is neither to determine whether wars can be justified nor to evaluate
which criteria must be met for a war to be "just." Instead, 1 am
interested in the practical problems of making moral decisions within
the context of war. Whether one finds war, in general, to be justi-
fiable or not, one still has the responsibility for his moral decisions
should he find himself fighting in a conflict.
Second, the PDE is a principle which is used (1) by the agent to
help him decide which of the alternatives available to him is morally
correct and (2) by anyone evaluating the moral worth of the action he
does perform. While it might be argued that an agent's intent is
purely a private matter that observers do not have access to, 1 think
it is safe to say there are a number of ways we can evaluate an
agent's intent. One of the most common ways of doing this is by
asking the agent what his intent was in doing the act and then com-
paring his behavior before and during the act against his claimed
intent. This method is often used in our legal system when trying
individuals for criminal offenses. Even if the accused has admitted
19
performing a wrong act, his intent may well be a mitigating or even
exonorating factor.
Next, 1 would like to admit that war is a nasty and brutish
business. There is no way to get around this fact, even if one
claims the highest of ideals in its prosecution. It is inevitable
that lots of people will be killed, including those who neither take
part in the fighting nor participate in the material support of it.
From the outset 1 want to recognize that there is a fairly large
class of people who fall into the category of "innocent" people.
They are innocent in the sense that they are not participants in
war. Clearly, there are hard cases in which it is difficult to
determine what an individual's status is in relation to the war
effort. But our inability to make a clear distinction between the
innocent and non-innocent in certain hard cases does not entail that
1
6
such a distinction does not exist.
The point in recognizing this class of "innocents" is to con-
fer upon them a special status during wartime. This status is one
of immunity. It is wrong to violate this immunity intentionally.
Whether or not these people have an absolute right to this immunity
is another matter and beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly, how
one views the issue of human rights, especially in war, will have a
significant impact on the PDE.^^ Nonetheless, I would like to set
the matter aside and touch upon it as little as possible during the
course of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume
20
that the right of the innocent to immunity is a right that may be
violated. However, the agent who violates this right is under the
heaviest of burdens to justify his doing so. I say this in the
fullest awareness that this is a most controversial position.
I will assume that soldiers who participate in the fighting of
and those civilians who provide direct support to the "war-making
effort forfeit any rights to immunity until they surrender or are
unable to perform their war-related missions. By this I mean that
a soldier forfeits his immune status until either (1) he surrenders
to the enemy, (2) he is physically incapacitated, (3) he deserts and
actively avoids the prosecution of the conflict, or (4) hostilities
are ended. Civilians in "war support" positions forfeit their
immunity until either (1) their nation ceases fighting, (2) they
remove themselves from a position of actively performing their job,
or (3) they are incapacitated and unable to perform their job.
In addition, I will not assume that the rights and obligations
which hold between individuals are the same as those which hold
between collective entities, such as warring nations, or those which
hold between a nation and the citizens of an enemy nation. Suppose,
for example, that we recognize that we have an obligation not to
cause the deaths of innocent citizens of an enemy nation, yet may
kill its soldiery. What then are our obligations to the enemy state
as a collective entity? Are we permitted to bring about the "death"
of a state? I will grant that there are certain collective actions
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which cannot be done without the participation of all (or at least
a great many of) the individual members of that collective entity.
But 1 think that participating members in a collective entity acting
as a part of that entity may have different obligations to indivi-
duals who are members of other collective entities than they normally
would acting on an individual basis.
Finally, 1 would like to point out that goals of military leaders
and statesmen in war oftentimes run counter to the moral prescriptions
of the deontologist
. Their primary concern is directed towards what
is best for the nation state, in terms of its ability to survive and
fight the war. They are generally concerned with whether the overall
consequences of their military actions are best for their own nation.
While moral considerations may play a part in their calculations,
they do not necessarily play an integral part. On the other hand
the deontologist ' s considerations concern what is best for everyone
in terms of moral good. He determines whether an action in war is
morally good by appeal to certain moral rules which apply to the
consequences of that action. From this we can see the essential con-
flict between the moral philosopher and the soldier. Wars cannot be
fought without the use of enough force to cause the enemy to sue for
peace. Thus, the claims of "military necessity" weigh heavily in any
situation in war where moral considerations also play a role. The
question then becomes how to square the military objectives desired
by the statesmen and generals with the moral prohibitions imposed by
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the moralists. I will allow, for the time being, that this problem
can be resolved by the PDE. I will have more to say on this matter
later
.
With these considerations in mind let us now begin our discus~
sion of the PDE in depth. I will begin with some basic considera-
tions of the agent in forming an intent and the notion of intention
in general. Both topics are important in establishing a framework
for my later discussion.
CHAPTER II
INTENTION
Intention and Foreseeable Consequences
Most people who advocate the PDE feel there is an essential dis-
tinction between a person's intending something and his foreseeing
that the same thing will come about as a consequence of what he does.
They say that if the agent intends to do a morally wrong act, then he
most certainly has done a wicked thing. However, if he intends to do
an act which is good but foresees that the act will have some bad
side-effects, then it is not so clear that the agent has done a
morally- wrong thing when he performs that act. It seems to them that
an agent's having an intention to perform an act entails, at the
least, his belief that his actions will very likely bring about the
results he desires. Any side-effects brought about are only "in-
directly" intended, if intended at all. Perhaps the consequences
of an act are indirectly intended if they are foreseen as probable
1
8
or possible. If the results are foreseen as not very likely to
occur or as not occurring at all, then it is questionable whether
the agent even indirectly intends them. An agent who does not fore-
see the act's side effects at all does not even indirectly intend to
produce them.
On the other hand, if the bad side effects are such that the
agent cannot even consider the act without seeing that the bad side
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effects are inextricably connected to it, then PDE proponents agree
that this is no matter of mere "indirect" intention. Surely the
agent must intend those consequences which he sees are inevitably
bound up in performing the act in question. On this view, the agent
who recognizes that his doing an act entails his bringing about bad
results as well as good cannot claim he intends the one and not the
other.
An Intention as a "Directing of the Will "
Elizabeth Anscombe in her article, "War and Murder" discusses a
problem very similar to this one. She states that an actor who know-
ingly performs an action which produces bad consequences in order to
bring about in turn still other good consequences cannot claim his
act as morally permissible. The agent in seeing that the bad con-
sequences are concommitant and causally related to the good con-
sequences cannot claim he intended the good but not the bad. She
puts it this way;
I know a Catholic boy who was puzzled at being told
by his schoolmaster that it was an "accident" that
the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were there to
be killed... It is nonsense to pretend that you do
not intend do what is the means you take to your
chosen end.
Thus, for Anscombe and others, if one's act will clearly result in
both good and bad consequences (the bad consequences almost certainly
being a means to bring about the good)
,
then one intends those bad
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consequences as well as the good. Anscombe, then, is concerned with
a special case of an action that will produce with a high degree a
probability both good and bad consequences. One cannot both "direct"
himself to intend the good consequences and then allow himself not
to intend the bad consequences.
Anscombe 's response above is to a commonly held concept of inten-
tional action. Under this concept the agent's intending to do some-
thing may be considered in itself a separate internal act of the mind.
This internal mental act may in turn be produced and directed by the
mind to the "appropriate intentional object" without regard to whether
the agent s intending to bring about good effects also means that he
will probably bring about dire consequences. The agent merely has to
focus his intent on the appropriate good results and his action, what-
ever it may be, is permissible.
If this is supposed to be what an intention is, then we must face
some conclusions which seem to be counter-intuitive. First of all, we
do not always have a voice in our head saying "Well I know my doing a
will result in both b and c...and that b is bad... But I won't intend
b; instead I will intend c, which is good..." Clearly, if this
"mental dialogue" occurred every time we performed a voluntary action,
we would certainly respond to the exigencies of our environment much
more slowly and perhaps with a much greater awareness of what was going
on than we normally do.
Another problem with this conception is that it seems to assume
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that one's intention is relevant only at the moment of acting. Every
time we act, apparently, we must have a relevant intention. So, if we
have some intention of doing an act at some earlier time, we must
reaffirm that intention by mentally picturing it at the moment of
our action. According to this conception we are like the little
train in the children's story who went around constantly saying to
himself "1 think I can... I think I can...l think 1 can." For one
to validly claim an intention of his to be in effect at some time,
t, he must be consciously conceiving it at t.
Again, I hardly think this is the way one's intention works.
Even though we oftentimes are not distinctly thinking of what we
intend while performing an action, when we are stopped and asked
what we intend to do we generally are able to give a distinct re-
sponse indicating a specific objective to which our act is directed.
Our intention to do something seems to be more along the lines of a
disposition to do an act when certain circumstances obtain. That is,
we intend at some earlier time to do an act at a later time or when
certain circumstances obtain. When we find ourselves in those parti-
cular circumstances or notice that the proper time has arrived, we
are disposed towards doing the action without repeating our earlier
thought process.
A common instance where this "disposition to act" is not
specifically reflected on by the agent may be seen in the combat
training of soldiers. A soldier is taught to react immediately in
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a particular way to certain stimuli without pausing to deliberate on
which action is appropriate. For instance, soldiers are trained to
hit the dirt" whenever they hear weapons firing in their vicinity.
They practice this response until it becomes a matter of habit. Thus,
when they are shot at in actual combat, they will immediately dive
for cover without having had a deliberate thought in the form of in-
tending to dive for cover. Nonetheless, if they are asked afterward
what they intended to do when they heard the gunfire, they will
undoubtedly respond with something like "I intended to hit the dirt"
or "I intended to dive for cover."
Still another difficulty with the view lies in the great emphasis
it places on the distinction between the agent's intent and the action
that results. The action as it actually turns out is of secondary
moral importance if the agent has directed his intention in a morally
acceptable manner. Whether an act is permissible is determined by
whether the agent's preceeding intent was good. Now, if the agent's
intent is such an overriding factor in our morally judging the agent,
then why not make it the sole criterion? The answer is obvious. We
often have intentions which we do not fulfill. I think that many of
us would be in dire straits, morally speaking, if we were judged
solely on our intentions alone. Fortunately for us (and everyone
else) many of our bad intentions (as purely mental acts) never come
to fruition. Moreover, most of us would not like to think that our
moral status depended solely upon our intentions alone, especially
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considering all the bad ones we have adopted at some time or other.
A fourth worry with this view of intention concerns the idea
that we must constantly maintain good intentions. If we are always
conscious of our intention just before we act (as this view supposes)
and are judged primarily upon our intention, we are responsible for
any act in which we have had intentions. So now we are acting in a
morally blameworthy manner if our intention is not good. That is,
if we perform an act which on all other accounts is morally permiss-
ible and yet our intentions are wrong, then we are acting wrongly.
Even if we agree that we should not be praised for such acts, I think
we would agree that we should not be adjudged as doing wrong either.
My final concern with this concept is the notion of "an intention
produced at will." As we have already seen, according to this theory,
we are capable of "directing" our intentions towards morally suitable
results. Now, if we are able to "direct" our intentions, then it
seems that this is an action requiring an intention also. But, if
this is so, then it appears to be the case that we "intend to intend."
Moreover, it appears that these "intentions to intend" must be of the
morally suitable kind, (i.e., good ones). However, if we accept this,
then it is possible that we could have a bad intention to have a good
intention. On top of that, our bad intention in having a good inten-
tion would negate the goodness of the overall act.
There are really two problems expressed in this last worry.
The first concerns how intentions get initiated. If intentions are
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interior acts of the mind which are willed (or intended), then must
the second-order intentions in turn be intended, and so on? Without
a doubt, we are faced with a possible infinite regression if we cannot
establish at what point our intention and, hence, action is initiated.
The second problem stems for the first. If we do have intentions
to intend, and so on, with succeeding higher order intentions, then
there is a problem in establishing which level of intention is
morally relevant. For example, do we say the intention that
immediately causes the action is the intention to be judged? Or is
it the intention to intend to act? Or is it somehow a combination
of the two?
1 think it is fairly evident that these kinds of problems bring
about more confusion than assistance to the moral judgment of acts.
Because this particular view of intention leads to these kinds of
problems, we are probably safe in assuming that it is not correct.
Perhaps we ought to consider another view of intention that is held
by many.
A Humean Conception of Intention
Another concept that many people hold postulates that intention
is "nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious
of when we knowlingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or
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new perception of our mind." This conception, articulated by Hume,
is also problematic. As with the first conception of intention men-
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tioned, there seems to be an assumption that we always have an
occurrent intention whenever we perform an intentional act. This
notion is worrisome for the reasons 1 have already mentioned.
A more important trouble with this concept is that it seems
to render the causal connection between an act and its intention
irrelevant. Intention is a mere mental adjunct to physical action.
Hume seems to have believed that we could show no causal relationship
between a person's intention and the subsequent action done to fulfill
that intention. For him at least, an intention is merely something
that occurs cotemporaneously with the action. To claim more than
this is to claim more than we can empirically substantiate.
If an agent's intention is, therefore, nothing but a mere "feel-
ing" accompanying the initiation of his action, then the agent may well
have an intentional feeling when he performs a particular act that is
good. However, it is not clear that this intentional feeling plays a
direct role in influencing the agent's action So, one could argue it
is not a factor that bears on the moral worth of the action.
A Humean conception of intention, then, undermines the PDF in a
subtle way. Because we cannot make the strict claim that an agent's
intentions generate his actions, we may be forced into a quandary as
to what role, if any, intentions should play in our moral evaluation
of actions. For whatever intention the agent may have had preceding
the action, good or bad, we cannot say that it was that intention that
triggered the action.
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We can see that if this is true, then the distinction between
foresight and intention which is so crucial to the PDE virtually dis-
appears. The difference between an agent’s intending good consequences
and merely foreseeing bad consequences becomes a matter of the agent's
attitude towards what he envisions will be the potential consequences
of his action. The intended consequence is the foreseen one which
the agent desires and, as a result, places a special mental emphasis
on. If this is the case, then it seems that all we have to do is
properly align our "intentional attitude" with the morally accept-
able consequence (s ) that we foresee as resulting from our action.
Since the most we can say under this Humean conception of intending
is that there is an "association" between a person's intention and
the resultant action, all a person has to do is make sure that he has
the proper intentional feeling associated with his action. His action
is then morally permissible regardless of what he does. Clearly,
this view of intention is as undesirable as the one I discussed pre-
viously. In divorcing the agent's action from his intention, it
makes morality a mental exercise.
Aune and Intention as a "Disposition to Act"
While these theories are clearly problematic, we should not yet
give up hope of making sense of the notion. A more recent and plausible
view has been presented by Bruce Aune in his book Reason and Action .
His ideas on intention are as follows:
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We have to learn to think in conceptual terms
and in learning this we develop propensities to
behave (verbally and otherwise) in ways appropriate
for various thoughts. Part of what is involved in
learning to think in a volitional way is that we
develop a propensity to make appropriate movements
in response to thoughts like ”1 will now do such
and such. Thus, the words "I will now raise my
hand" may run through our minds but if they do not
trigger off a propensity to move our hand in the
required way, they will not express, for us, the
relevant volitional thought.
For Aune
,
then, intentions are to be thought of as propensities to
speak and act in particular ways that are in accordance with certain
intentional thoughts. As we proceed through life we learn that
certain behaviors are appropriate for particular circumstances. We
learn that doing a particular action in a set of circumstances will
bring about certain results. If the results are those that are
acceptable for us or perhaps even desirable, then we infer that this
behavior will be appropriate in the future. The individual learns to
conceptualize in a particular set of circumstances that it is correct
for him to try to do a particular act or manifest certain behavior.
Thus, if he finds himself in that particular set of circumstances he
will tend to conclude that he will do the appropriate act at that time.
That, in turn, usually prompts the appropriate movements needed to
perform the act. The relation of intention with action is, then, a
causal one; but one of selective causality. Not all intentions trigger
action and not all action is set off by intentions. Aune says this the
following way:
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...belief and intentions are best thought of as
propensities to think certain things or to use
certain premises, and a simple pattern of reason-
ing involving thoughts appropriate to both beliefs
and intentions is this: If we have the premises
"I will do A in C" and "I am now in C," we will
tend to conclude "I will now do A” . . . the transi-
tion from.
. .complex thoughts to the appropriate
movements, may be viewed causally: the premises
prompt the volitional conclusions, and the
volitional conclusion triggers off the movements.
There i^2thus a causal chain from thought to
action.
The important point to remember here is that in order for this chain
of reasoning to obtain, the agent must believe both that he is in
the appropriate circumstances to do his act and that his doing the act
will bring about the state of affairs he desires. It is my opinion
that much of the trouble with the PDE lies in trying to justify these
beliefs
. One s intent is inextricably linked with his beliefs about
the world around him and his relation to other things in it. In a
later section of this paper I will discuss this dicey problem of
applying the appropriate beliefs and perceptions one has about the
world while at the same time trying to determine if they are, in fact,
accurate. As one might well imagine this is a problem of monumental
proportions in war.
Two Uses of the Term "Intention"
In the foregoing discussion I have used the term "intention" in
two different ways. I think it is best at this point to look at the
distinction between the two uses of the term. One way we use the term
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IS to refer to an agent's mental state. In everyday language we
often say "Yes, he had the intention of doing something." When we
employ the term in this way we are marking an agent's mental state.
We are saying nothing about what the mental state is directed toward.
The other way we use the term is to denote the object of the
agent s mental state. We use it in this sense to refer to what is
intended as a result of the agent's action. For instance, we might
say, "Captain Jones' intention, in positioning his company at battle
position "Trasimene," was to ambush and destroy an enemy armored
column." In this sentence we are talking about the object of the
agent's action, the state of affairs the agent desires to bring about,
not his mental state. It is important that we do not confuse these
two uses of the term. Generally speaking, when I use the term I mean
to express the object of the agent's action.
Intention as a Relativized Notion
There are other relevant points about the notion of intention
that I think need to be discussed before continuing. We will need to
grasp them for our discussion later. The first point is that it often
makes more sense to talk of an agent's intention in an action (as the
object of his mental state) with respect to a time, desired con-
sequences, and a set of circumstances. In other words, it is often
best understood as a relativized notion. To see why it is, let's
consider the sentence "John intended." This sentence certainly
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tells us little if anything at all about John.^^ One might think
It says something about a particular feeling that John had. But, it
seems to me that 1 do not have the same "feelings," or even the same
kind of feeling each time 1 intend something. That is, my emotional
state and physical sensations differ each time 1 have an intention.
So, this sentence probably does not report a feeling that John has.
What does it report? Your guess is as good as mine. Nevertheless,
in examining this sentence we can see that the word "intends" has
a much clearer meaning when used to refer to an intentional object.
The sentence, John now intends to join the army on his eighteenth
birthday" is much more helpful, because it puts John’s intention in
a referential context.
To be perfectly clear when we discuss a person's intention,
then, it is useful to specify what action the person intends, the
time he intends the action, and the relevant conditions that apply
to the situation. Our knowing what action the agent thinks he is
intending to perform gives us an idea what act should follow and a
frame of reference to judge his act. It tells us something about
what the agent expected to do and perhaps allows us to infer some-
thing about the kinds of acts he did not want to do. For example,
suppose Captain Jones says to us "I intend to trap and annihilate
the approaching armor column." It seems reasonable (taking this
sentence at face value wthout considering the surrounding circum-
stances or the time at which it was intended) to infer that Captain
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Jones does not expect that his own unit will be defeated. Moreover,
we may reasonably infer that the enemy column is not composed of non-
combatants. Practically speaking, we can tell a great deal about how
Captain Jones envisions what he is doing and the results he wishes to
obtain. Moreover, we can tell a great deal more about what he does
and does not intend to do.
The notion of time is also very important. Many intentional acts
only make sense to us if we know when they are intended. For example,
it would have made no sense for President Truman to have said in 1940,
"I intend to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima." At that time the bomb
had not been developed and, so far as we know, Truman had no idea that
such a bomb could be developed. He first learned of its existence in
the spring of 1945, only a few months before he gave the actual order
to use it. Besides, it is reasonable to assume that he vacillated
before he finally decided to use the bomb. As in this case, we need
to know when an individual had an intention before we evaluate it.
Whether the agent's description of the act he intends is con-
sistent with relevant circumstances also plays an important role in
our understanding what an agent's intention is at a particular time.
The circumstances serve either to justify or invalidate the agent's
claim to have such-and-such an intention. To see this, let's consider
the case in which a soldier says, "I intended to shoot that enemy
soldier in self-defense." Normally we would say that this is a
reasonable way to describe the actions of soldiers participating in
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combat. But, if the enemy soldier was in the act of surrendering, or
if he was lying on the battlefield seriously wounded, we would be much
less inclined to describe the intention that way.
We have now seen that an agent's intention is more clearly under-
stood when relativized to the factors I have mentioned. These rela-
tivizing factors, however, are not the only considerations relevant
in considering an agent's intention. There is still another factor
that plays an important role. When we discuss an agent's action, we
normally try to consider what options were available to him at the
time he made his choice and committed himself to his chosen action.
At almost any time an agent has a number of relevant alternatives
available, each of which is performable by him. On many occasions
the agent either is not aware of all these alternatives or does not
perceive them all as being performable. An agent's intention is
based upon a choice to perform one action instead of the others that
he perceives open for him to do. We will doubtless want to consider
his intended act not only in relation to some absolute standard of
right and wrong but also in light of what the agent thought he could
have done otherwise. One's intention is a matter of choice. A
deontologist attempts to determine what all the relevant performable
acts open to him are. He then tries to determine which of the possible
actions are morally right. That is, he determines which of his actions
in terms of their consequences do not violate the moral rules he
accepts. The one or ones that do not violate these rules are per-
missible acts, acts morally open for him to intend to perform.
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Some Epistemological Considerations of Intention
I have been sidestepping an important issue for quite awhile now.
All along I have been talking about "relevant" circumstances, "relevant"
alternatives and the like. What I have not said is what makes these
things relevant for the agent. The success an agent has in making
moral choices will be limited by the way he perceives the situation
and the actions open to him. We can put these perceptions and beliefs
that the agent entertains into three general categories. They are
(1) beliefs about the circumstances the agent is in and the correct-
ness of the intended action for those circumstances, (2) beliefs of
the agent about his ability to perform the intended action and bring
about the intended consequences of it, and (3) beliefs about potential
consequences occurring other than those intended. Let's turn to the
first of these categories.
When an agent is in a position to make moral choices, he generally
tries to evaluate the circumstances he is in and ascertain what courses
of action are available to him. Once he has completed these prelimin-
aries, he determines which acts are relevant for the situation and
then decides which of these are morally appropriate for the accomplish-
ment of the consequences that he intends to bring about. Now, it is
fairly evident that different people may, and often do, perceive the
same situation in different, even radically different, ways. An
important factor is what evidence and which facts are readily avail-
able to the agent. Certainly one's cognizance or ignorance of critical
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information will play an important role in one's decision-making
process
.
Not all individuals have the same access to relevant information
in a given situation. This difference may be attributed to any number
of factors. There may not be enough time to collect and digest all
the relevant information. Perhaps an individual's data collecting
ability is limited. Maybe the individual's ability to analyze the
given information is hampered due to his own intellectual limita-
tions. Perhaps there are external factors which limit his evaluat-
ing this data effectively and completely.
These limitations are compounded by an individual's natural pre-
disposition towards evaluating raw data in a biased manner. One's
cultural indoctrination, ideology, religion, past experience, and
previous moral and professional training will all play an important
role in influencing the agent's understanding and evaluation of a
given situation. So, I think it is fair to say that there are many
factors which preclude the agent's making completely unbiased and
objective evaluations with respect to any given situation.
Assuming that each of our perspectives on the world is slanted by
different sociological, experiential and environmental factors, it is
not surprising that different persons may describe the same situation
in different terms, different enough to influence their understanding
of what alternatives are open to them, and perhaps even the determina-
tion of which action they choose. One can well imagine that these
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factors play a critical role in the perceptions of those leaders of
warring nations who are faced with making moral decisions. Moreover,
It IS fairly easy to see why different nations may view the same
incidents in radically different ways.
A second type of belief which is critical in an individual’s
intent is his belief about the performability of the course of action
he chooses and how likely it is that his performing it will bring about
the ends he intends. Once again the agent's training, past experience,
innate resourcefulness, his ability to predict realistically and account
for how external influences will affect his action, and his ability to
evaluate realistically his own capabilities will all play a role in
his determining whether he beleives he is capable of accomplishing the
task at hand. Remember, the agent must believe he is capable of doing
the action in terms of how he envisions it when he is considering his
alternatives. If the alternative he chooses is described as, for
example, "destroying the enemy's main manufacturing center without
killing a large number of innocent civilians," then the action he
believes he can perform must fit the description above. The agent
must believe his act is performable, as he describes or envisions it.
Thus, if the agent believes that he cannot perform the act under this
description, then he believes that it is not an alternative available
to him.
It is important to note here that whether or not the agent is
actually capable of accomplishing the action is not the critical issue.
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The agent s decision and subsequent intention to do the act is based
upon his ^lief that a certain state of affairs will obtain as a result
of his doing that act. It may well happen that the agent believes he
is capable of performing the act when, in fact, he is not. Conversely,
he may believe that he is unable to perform the act and yet, in
actuality, be able to do it.
In the last category of beliefs are those that have to do with
potential consequences of the act that are not intended. Generally,
when an agent considers a potential act he tries to determine what
the consequences of this act might be. Some consequences are readily
apparent while others are not. The agent will be able to foresee with
reasonable certainty that certain conseqeunces will occur while others
may be less probable or even just barely possible. It is fairly clear
as a general rule, that the agent will tend to place greater emphasis
on the consequences he foresees as more certain and pay less attention
to those consequences which are less probable or only possible. For
instance, suppose that a soldier intends to shoot his rifle at an enemy
soldier. Let's also suppose that he is an excellent marksman. When-
ever he fires at a target, he usually hits it. Today, however, he
misses the enemy soldier with his first shot. The bullet ricochets off
a nearby rock and kills a civilian passing nearby.
In this case it is farily clear that the probability of the
soldiers' killing the civilian in the way he did was very low, cer-
tainly much lower than his chances of shooting the enemy soldier.
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Moreover, it would seem reasonable to say that when the soldier fired
his rifle, he envisioned that the enemy soldier would be shot as a
direct result of his action, not the civilian. So it seems that the
relative probability of the potential consequences plays an important
role here. Generally speaking, we intend those consequences which we
believe will be direct consequences of our action and which we believe
are likely to occur as a result of our action. If we perceive the
results of our actions as I have stated, then we incorporate those
beliefs into our intention. That is, we commonly think that the
intended consequences of an agent's action are (1) foreseen bv him
and (2) believed by him to be a direct result of his action.
I should point out here that there are various problems with the
conception of intention 1 have portrayed above. One major question
has to do with whether an agent's belief that a foreseen consequence
is certain and a direct result of his action is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for that consequence to be intended by him. We might
well agree that it is necessary for an agent to believe his intended
consequence is likely to occur as a result of his act. In addition,
we would probably agree that it is necessary for him to believe the
intended consequence stems directly from his action. Yet, it is fairly
clear that these beliefs do not constitute a sufficient condition for
intent. To see this we need only consider the following example.
Let us suppose that our Captain Jones is given the mission of
moving his tank company from position A to position B. Unfortunately,
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this mission requires Jones to cross farmer Williams' freshly planted
corn field. This will in all probability ruin Williams' corn harvest
for the year. We will also suppose that this unpleasant consequence
is foreseen by Jones as a likely direct result of performing his
mission to move his tank company to position B. Moreover, let's set
Williams field across a valley floor in between two very steep and
rugged mountains. These mountains are so steep that Jones and his
tank company cannot go around the field: they must traverse it.
About five minutes later Jones' battalion commander calls him on the
radio and tells him that he must move his company to position B
immediately and prepare a defensive position to block an enemy
penetration.
Now the question is whether Jones' belief that the field will
probably be destroyed as an immediate consequence of his action is
sufficient for us to say that he intends to destroy the crops and
thereby ruin farmer Williams' harvest. It seems that his intending to
cross the field in the pursuit of accomplishing his mission is quite a
different thing from his intending to destroy the farmer's crops even
if that is a direct result of the action. It seems to me that the
beliefs I have attributed to Jones are not sufficient enough to con-
stitute his intending to destroy the field. Of course, it may be correct
to say that Jones has not intended not to destroy the field. Jones'
failure to intend that the field is not destroyed does not entail,
however, that he intended the field to be destroyed.
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Intention and the Problem of Agent Control in Actions
Another problem we encounter when discussing the notion of intent
is the degree of control the agent has in bringing to bear the action
and resultant consequences he intends. There are those actions which
the agent has the physical power to bring about without the assistance
of other actors. The agent in these actions has immediate voluntary
control over what he does with his own body and how those bodily
motions result in the action. For example, if Captain Jones intends
to drive his own tank to position B, then his action is under his
immediate voluntary control He uses his own physical movements to
manipulate the controls of the tank. This in turn brings about his
driving to position B.
Not all results that agents intend are under their immediate con-
trol. Whether the intended result obtains sometimes depends, at least
in part, on the contributory actions of other individuals. In the case
of Captain Jones, we would say that although he intends full well to
move his company to position B, he cannot do this by himself. He is
dependent on his subordinates' responses to his order and on how well
they carry it out. Many actions in combat are cases in which the
intending agent's control over the outcome of the situation is much less
than optimal. In this sort of intending the agent's action is depend-
ent upon a number of "sub-actions" performed by other agents who each
has his own intents and beliefs about the overall situation and the
nature of his own "subaction." When this type of situation occurs, it
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IS far more difficult to assess the resultant action and consequences
with regard to the primary agents' intent.
This problem is complicated further in those cases where an
agent s intended action is based upon an expected response by an
opponent whose own intent is to thwart that action. Commanders in
combat are constantly faced with this type of situation. They have
an overall plan that they intend to put into action. The plan's
successful execution is dependent upon how well the commander's sub-
ordinates follow the plan. In addition, the plan's success depends
upon whether the enemy responds in the way the commanders have
envisioned. A problem in any of these three areas may directly affect
both the agents intended action and its consequences. I will have
more to say about this after I have discussed the notion of fore-
seeability in greater detail.
The Notion of "Bare" Intentions
There is one final point about intention that I would like to
take up at this time. We often say that there is a difference between
an agent's intention in an act he is performing or has performed and
his intention in a potential action that he may perform in the future.
In the first case the agent's intention has a direct causal relation to
the action and its consequences. However, there is no such relation-
ship in the second case because the agent's intention is as yet un-
realized. Is this a critical distinction? And if so, what should we
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make of it?
I think, first of all, that if we consider an intention a pro-
pensity to act in a certain way, given a certain set of circumstances,
then we have to consider both intentions in occurrent actions and
intentions for hypothetical future situations as bona fide intentions.
It seems to me that a major concern with the PDE is how intention
relates to actions. The agents' performance of an intended action and
its results are what we are trying to determine as either permissible
or impermissible. This being the case, we might have a tendency to say
that an intention to act in some future situation has no moral worth
until that situation is actualized. This is an assumption which might
lead to some serious philosophical problems.
One thing that concerns me with this idea is that there is a great
deal of similarity between unrealized intentions concerning the future
and current intentions not to perform actions. In both cases there
is no change in the agents' behavior that we can point to. The
agent's intention may have produced no overt physical action. In both
cases the agent may in no way influence the action going on around him.
He is a willing non-participant, so to speak (at least for the moment).
Yet I think that there are occasions when we do not act and yet
24behave in a morally impermissible manner. For instance, consider
a situation where a soldier comes across a wounded soldier from
another unit. Let's suppose that the wounded soldier has been shot
in the leg and is bleeding profusely. Prompt first aid will stop the
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bleeding and possibly save the wounded soldier’s life. On the other
hand, if the soldier is allowed to continue bleeding, he may well die.
Our soldier. Private Smith, knows how to treat the wound correctly and
exposes himself to no risks if he gives first aid to the wounded
soldier. Would we say that it is impermissible and blameworthy for
Smith to pass on without giving the wounded man first aid? 1 think
so. Even though Smith might do no further harm to the soldier, we
would say that in this case that Smith's inaction is wrong. If Smith
intends not to act in this case and passes on, then he is morally cul-
pable. We would probably say he is obligated to help the wounded
soldier in this case. That is, he morally ought to act.
Now it seems to me that if intentions not to act can be morally
wrong, they can also be morally right. Hence, intentions which result
in no change of behavior may have moral worth. In a similar manner,
intentions for contingent future situations also have moral worth.
For example, the stated or inferred intentions of one person may well
influence the behavior of another person, even though there is no
apparent physical cause-and-effeet relationship. In fact, deterrence
theory is based upon this possibility. Even though the United States
has never used any nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, our
expressed intention to do so should certain Soviet actions obtain has
apparently prevented the Soviet Union from using their arsenal of nuclear
25
weapons thus far. So it seems, in one sense anyway, that "bare"
intent can have moral worth both in the case of intention for future
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contingent acts and intentions not to act (or act omissions).
As we have seen in this somewhat lengthy discussion, the concept
of intention has many aspects which complicate our evaluation of it in
actual situations. Closely tied to the notion of intention is the
concept of foreseeability. We have already touched upon it somewhat
because it is almost impossible to talk of intention without also
considering it. In the next chapter I will discuss the notion of
foreseeability in greater detail and also consider some of the
factors of combat, and gaming strategy which have an effect on a
soldier s ability to clearly foresee the consequences of his actions.
Essential to this discussion will be my attempt to identify some con-
fusions in distinguishing an act from its consequences. With that in
mind, let's turn to the concept of foreseeability.
CHAPTER III
FORESIGHT
Foresight and Belief
As I have already implied, the notion of foresight is rather
difficult to come to grips with. It seems to me that foresight is
a special variety of belief. However, it is belief not about current
states of affairs but instead states of affairs likely to occur in
the future. More specifically, the agent believes that because a
certain state of affairs is now true, a certain other state of affairs
will obtain at some future time.
In having a foresight, the agent must make certain inferences
from the knowledge, beliefs, and perceptions he currently holds.
He generally bases his inferences on his observations of similar
situations that have occurred in the past. If a certain state of
affairs occurs under a particular set of circumstances, then the
agent will tend to believe that similar results will occur as have
occurred in similar situations in the past. Of course the tricky
part of this process is to insure one is in a suitably similar set
of circumstances so that he may be justified in making the inference.
In fact, the agent must be able to determine the relevant aspects
of his current situation before he ever makes the comparison. I
will argue later in this chapter that the inherent nature of combat
works against the agent's being able to assess accurately his own
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situation and, hence, against his making an accurate forecast of
what will result from his action.
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Foresight as a Relativized Concept
Before turning to that discussion, however, it will be in our
interest to discuss some other relevant aspects of foresight. Fore-
sight, like intention, is a relativized concept. First and foremost,
it must be understood as a term that has meaning in relation to a par'
ticular individual. In legal discussions we often hear phrases like
"what the common man would foresee" or "the judgment is based upon
what a reasonable man would foresee." In moral discussions we are
concerned about what a particular person actually does foresee in a
situation. We are concerned about his own particular foresight
(and intention) because it is his own foresight that directly bears
upon his action. What a "reasonable man" would foresee in the same
action might not necessarily be the same thing as what any particular
27individual does foresee. In fact, I think all of us can think of
occasions where the results of our actions were evident to almost
everyone but ourselves. If we were wrong in the situation, we un-
doubtedly made clear the point that the obvious result everyone else
foresaw played no role in our decision, intention and action. We did
not foresee that consequence.
One major reason why we often foresee consequences of an action
that other people do not is that we conceptualize our action differ-
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ently. Our beliefs are about states of affairs which may be en-
visioned and expressed in a multitude of different ways. Since we
each cannot think of all these ways, it is not surprising that we
often think of some situations differently. For example, the following
two sentences might express the same situation.
£: Sergeant Brown fired his tank at a suspected enemy head-
quarters building, destroying it.
q: Sergeant Brown killed nine innocent civilians.
Clearly, in this case, how the act is described makes a great deal of
difference to our moral attitudes about it. Brown's perception of the
states of affairs involved in this action is likely to be different
from that of a civilian observer standing near the building who, to
his horror, is aware that there are women and children in the building.
So there are really two considerations involved here. The first
concerns how the agent envisions his action. How he genuinely thinks
of it affects his moral attitude toward it. The second consideration
is that the agent's conception of his act limits somewhat the con-
sequences he will foresee as stemming from it. For example. Brown's
believing that he is firing on an enemy headquarters greatly limits
the reasonableness of the thought that nine innocent civilians will
die as a result. From a moral point of view it may be helpful for an
agent to consider his action under several different descriptions.
Unlike one's intention, which is often focussed narrowly on one
particular consequence, one's foresight may include a whole range of
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consequences. As a result, it seems to me that a moral agent is much
better off with an active and vivid imagination. For then he is able
to consider the act itself under a greater range of descriptions and
can thereby foresee more of the probable consequences of his action.
The number and moral acceptability of the probable consequences, other
than those intended, will play a major role in influencing the agent's
eventual action.
By the foregoing discussion 1 have not meant to imply that each
time before we perform an action we consider a whole list of act des-
criptions that our act might fall under. What we do instead is con-
sider as many of the circumstances which could play a part in our
action as we can. We then try to envision what consequences would be
likely to occur from our doing the act under those circumstances. It
is in this way that we conceptualize the various states of affairs
which characterize our intended action and its probable consequences.
Foreseeability and Probability
The next point which should be discussed here is what constitutes
"probability" for the foreseen consequences of an act. We know that
not all of the things we foresee are certain to occur. Yet, on the
other hand, the consequences of our acts would not be foreseen if
they were not in some way believed by us to be likely to occur. The
notion of foresight, then, connotes that what is foreseen is more
than a mere possibility. There are grounds for us to believe that a
53
particular state of affaris is likely to happen. One way this concept
has been expressed is that a state of affairs is probable if and only
if it is epistemically possible and it is more reasonable to risk
something of value on that state of affairs occurring than to not
risk anything of value on its occurring. Thus, when we say some
state of affairs is foreseen we are at least reasonably confident
that it will occur. An agent's foresight, as 1 mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter, is a special belief about a future state
of affairs. So we should characterize foresight in terms of belief
about the future and the degree of reasonableness necessary for the
act to be foreseen. Accordingly, let's say a state of affairs is
foreseen by a person at some time if and only if that person believes
at that time it is at least probable for that state of affairs to occur
at some future time. It is fairly easy to see, then, that an intended
state of affairs is also a special case of a foreseen state of affairs.
An agent must foresee that the intended consequences are probable.
That is why he intends to do the act in the first place, to attain
that state of affairs. The major difference between the two notions
then is that the agent in intending something must have an interest
vested in bringing about that particular state of affairs. To fore-
see something, by contrast, the agent need not have an interest vested
in the foreseen consequence. An intention is always foreseen, but a
foreseeable state of affairs is not always intended.
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Factors Thst Biss One's Foresight
Earlier in this paper, I mentioned a number of sociological,
experiential and environmental factors which tend to color each person's
perception of the world. What a person attempts to forecast from
known facts is based to a very large degree on how these factors
have influenced the agent in the past. Each of us has learned a
particular set of cultural values, had different experiences and
has been affected by different external environmental factors. So,
for instance, 1 as an American army officer may well have a very
different outlook on the world than my Soviet counterpart. Many of
the ideals 1 hold may be incompatible with his. After all, the Soviet
social system promotes a different set of values than our system
does. In terms of education and occupational training, our backgrounds
may again differ. It is fairly evident that because we each have
different perspectives on political and social issues, we will choose
our courses of action based on different criteria. Accordingly many
of our chosen actions will differ as a result. In addition, what
we foresee as relevant and important will differ somewhat. Those
things which we each tend to emphasize will be more likely to be
considered as the immediate consequence of our actions than those
we do not consider important.
In wartime some of these factors take on even greater importance
than in peacetime. External environmental factors and actions per-
formed by the enemy, in particular, are critical elements in our
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decision-making process. Generally speaking, these two factors tend
to work against methodical, well-thought-out plans of action. It
is perhaps more difficult in battle to foresee what exact consequences
our actions will produce than, say, in ordinary day-to-day situations.
Moreover, it will be much more difficult in war to fulfill our
intended actions as we would like them fulfilled. Of course, the
main problem is that the enemy is acting in such a way as either to
thwart our intended actions or to deceive us about how our intended
action will affect him. That is, our opponents are not just passive
objects of our actions. They are also trying to act on us.^^ Hence,
war is a series of moves and counter-moves in which each move of ours
is taken only after considering both the enemy's last move and the
next move we expect of him.
Foresight and Inductive Reasoning
Prediction or foresight is usually based on inductive reasoning.
We observe a certain activity for a period until we recognize a set
pattern emerge. Then, we continue observing that pattern to reaffirm
that it recurs regularly. If it does, then we feel justified in
asserting that if one thing in that type of pattern occurs, then
another related thing will occur. We use inductive reasoning con-
tinually in our every day lives. A common instance of inductive
reasoning in war is as follows. We know enemy doctrine states that
the best time to attack is in the very early hours of the morning.
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say, between two and five o'clock. Moreover, every enemy attack that
we know of has occurred in this general time period. Because we know
these two facts, we tend to infer that the next time the enemy attacks
he will attack during that time period. Consequently, we make it a
point to be the most alert and prepared to fight at that time.
Contributory Actions and Foresight
While we will agree that people tend to act in certain general
patterns we cannot rely too much on this fact in combat. The reason
IS apparent. If the enemy always acted in the same way, we could
easily predict his actions and prepare ourselves to counter them.
Our task of securing victory would be much simpler if our enemies did
act in this way. Unfortunately they do not because they are also well
aware of the disastrous consequences of their acting in a predictable
manner. Accordingly they attempt, as we do, to vary their "tactical
behavior" and subsequently mislead or deceive us as to their true
intentions. Moreover, they attempt to do everything in their power
to prevent our observance of them for any prolonged period. They do
this, of course, to prevent us from obtaining enough data about their
activities to draw any accurate conclusions about them.
One of our objectives in war, then, is to vary our activity signi-
ficantly enough to prevent the enemy from inferring anything from it.
Our enemy, of course, will try to do the same thing. Misleading
tactical moves, deceptive or encoded communications and other counter-
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feit activity play an extremely important role in both strategic and
tactical planning. Not only do we attempt to confuse the enemy about
which of our actions are significant, but also about how they are
significant
.
In actual combat, then, the enemy's actions may pose a signifi-
cant problem for us in forecasting accurately what will result from
our own actions. Not only do we have to account for what the enemy
IS currently doing, but also what he may be doing in the immediate
future and also how he is responding or might respond to our actions.
Foresight then becomes a matter of determining not only what the
enemy’s current actions are, but also what actions he intends to per-
form in the future. Looking at this from another perspective, we can
say not only that our actions have a direct effect on the enemy, but
also that how the enemy perceives our intention in the act influences
his actions. So when we perform an action which affects the enemy, it
is very often difficult to determine whether the consequences result
directly from our action alone or result from the enemy's response to
our action in conjunction with the act itself. Clearly it is difficult
for anyone to foresee in some cases whether an agent's action directly
brings about the foreseen results.
Foresight and the Limitations of the Battlefield
So far we have been merely discussing foresight with respect to
strategy. However, one's foresight is also affected by battlefield
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conditions. These battlefield conditions affect the actions of every-
one from the highest-ranking generals to the lowest-ranking privates.
They affect a unit's communication, command and control structure,
and observation of the enemy. If any of these three things is affected,
one's ability to plan and act is seriously impaired. It must be
remembered that battlefield decisions are often made far from the
actual engagement. Moreover, many of the supporting weapons systems,
such as artillery, are fired without the benefit of being able to
observe the battlefield directly. Accordingly, the correct appli-
cation of relevant battlefield information is dependent on whether
units engaged in the fighting accurately report the information, are
able to pass and receive the information, and finally put into affect
the resultant orders in the manner that they were intended. It is
easy to see that if there is a breakdown anywhere along the line,
those people who make the decisions will have inaccurate or confused
perceptions of what, in fact, is going on. Once their beliefs about
the situation becomes distorted, any attempt to predict accurately or
plan for the future becomes almost impossible. It is easy to see,
then, that a commander's perception of a given situation may be
inaccurate and, thereby, may cause him to blunder with respect to both
the enemy and those civilians caught between his unit and the enemy.
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Time Limitations and the Factor of Stres s
Still another limiting factor in a soldier's perceptions of a
situation is the factor of time. In the middle of combat rapid
decisions are often required. The leader is not always blessed with
an unlimited amount of time to weigh all the appropriate circum-
stances and consider all the possible alternatives. The amount of
time available to make a decision may only be a minute, if it is even
that long. Moreover, the life-and-death decisions that are required
in combat situations place a considerable amount of stress on the
decision maker. Certainly the combination of stressful situations and
time constraints is not conducive to rational or well-thought-out
action. It is not surprising, then, that gross mistakes are made in
combat due to poor foresight.
Foresight and the Actions of the Innocent
Now you may be wondering what all this has to do with the unin-
tentional, yet foreseen, killing of innocents in combat. Well,
innocent people are often caught in the middle of military actions.
Sometimes they are there of their own volition and sometimes they are
not. In some cases people refuse to leave their homes. Their whole
life is centered around their homeland and, in particular their, village.
It is inconceivable for these people to leave these areas even though
they know they might be caught in the middle of a battle. That is,
they take the risk of remaining in the danger zone even though, as
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they know, they may lose their lives. On the other hand, other
innocent people may be overtaken by the action. This is the case
with those who get caught in the initial attacks of a war and those
who live near war-making industries in cities well behind friendly
lines
.
The important point here is that, like our adversary, innocent
people are sometimes in a position to control events and their relation
to them. It is not as if they are always unaware that there is a war
going on around them or that they are unable to remove themselves from
the scene of fighting. Like most agents, innocent persons also have
choices they can make in regard to the war. In many cases they choose
to be where they are, knowing that there are inherent risks in doing
so. While they are innocent of war-making activity, they still have
contributed, in a way, to their being in a dangerous situation. When
an innocent person chooses to continue to live two blocks from an
arms factory or an oil refinery, he may be running the obvious risk
of annihilation. I do not advocate the wholesale slaughter of women,
children and the elderly; but one must admit that their voluntary
presence on the battlefield may be a strong factor contributing to
their own harm.
Soldiers of one warring nation are able to influence the enemy's
activity and the actions of the civilian populace. But they do not
make choices either for the enemy or for non-combatants. That is
something those individuals do for themselves.
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The major thrust of this argument, then, is that the soldiers of
one warring party are not the only actors in the scenario. It is not
always the case that one individual (say a soldier) performs an
action on another while that other person passively allows himself
to be acted on. Other people and external circumstances often con-
tribute directly to an action or a state of affairs. While we are
acting on others, they are acting in a way that also affects us and
our decisions. The combination of the factors 1 have mentioned so
far may make it very difficult to foresee with any degree of certainty
what will be the exact consequences of one's action in combat.
Military planners, as well as soldiers on the ground, deal in the
world of probability. The probabilities they work with rarely approach
certainty. Even the simplest activity, such as pulling the trigger
on a rifle and attemtping to hit a target, is an action in which the
intended consequences may be foreseen, at best, as only probable.
The Problem of Distinguishing Acts and Their Consequences
We cannot complete our initial discussion of foresight without
touching upon the problem of distinguishing acts and consequences.
In talking about intending or foreseeing specific actions we pre-
suppose that all acts are "atomic" in nature. By saying that we
suppose that all acts are atomic, I mean that we seem to think of acts
as being individual entities of a special sort which may be considered
independently of each other and that there is a clear delineation
62
between each act and every other act. We tend to treat the con-
tinuum of action as if it is easily divisible into neat individual
parcels called acts. Act A is distinct and separable from Act B
and so on. In order to speak about a particular segment of action
we tend to treat that segment as a unique individual act. It is
as if our mental and linguistic division of action corresponds with
some actual dividing lines between acts.
While this view of action may be useful for us in our normal dis-
course about the world, it does not capture the world the way it really
IS. The current controversy over the problem of act individuation
makes this point quite obvious. With this debate have come a number
of theories, all of which purport to tell us the definitive way in
which we may delineate between different actions (and also between
actions and their consequences). These theories may be grouped into
two general categories. In the first category are those theories of
action which I call "unifier theories."^ The philosophers who espouse
them believe that actions (or events) are a basic ontological entity
and that they each can manifest a multitude of different descriptions.^^
For them actions are identical if and only if they have the same
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causes and effects.
The second major grouping includes those theories of action
3 ^
which I call "multiplier theories." Those who have proposed these
theories believe that actions are not basic ontological entities.
Instead, what we refer to as actions (or act-tokens) are logical
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constructs. That is, an action is some "act-property" that is
exemplified by some object at some time.^^ An act-property, then,
IS a property which a specified agent can exemplify. An example of
such an act-property might be "loading the howitzer" or "assaulting
the hill." These are properties because they can be true of some
person at some time.
Whenever one performs an act, he exemplifies at least one pro-
perty. That property is expressed by a gerundial noun clause.
Accordingly, when Private Doe shoots his rifle he exemplifies the
property of "shooting a rifle." An act (act-token), then, is a par-
ticular instantiation of an act-property by a particular person at a
specified time (or time interval). Under multiplier theories two acts,
A and B are identical if and only if (1) the act property exemplified
in A is identical to that exemplified in B, (2) the agent of A is
identical to the agent of B, and (3) the time that A occurs is identical
to the time that B occurs.
In writing this paper 1 have assumed a "unifier" position. While
I recognize that there are some serious philosophical objections to
this position, 1 feel that it best exemplifies our natural intuitions
about the nature of action. Moreover, I think that it is easier to
see some of the problems of relating intention to action using this
theory. However, I feel that the problems I am about to point out
to a degree are applicable also to the "multiplier" position. More-
over, even though not all of the problems I will bring up will be
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problems for "multiplier" theories, these theories are beset by a set
of their own peculiar problems.
Let s now turn to the question of act individuation. In order
to see why individuating between acts is problematic, we might do well
to take a look at an example. But first, let's consider the following
sentences which describe actions:
p: Smith squeezed his trigger finger,
q: Smith pulled the trigger,
r: Smith shot Ivan,
s: Smith killed Ivan.
How many actions are described here? One? Two? Three? Four? It
is extremely difficult to answer this question without knowing what
circumstances each of these sentences describes. Surely these
sentences describe anywhere from one to four actions depending on the
situation they describe and how we look at the situation.
Let's suppose that the agent referred to in these four sentences
is the same person and that the four sentences all apply to the follow-
ing vignette. Private Smith is on watch one evening in his foxhole.
All of a sudden he hears a voice in front of him. Immediately he peers
in the direction of the noise through his night-vision device.
Instantly he spots a figure and identifies him as an ememy soldier.
We will call this enemy soldier "Ivan." From the nature of Ivan's
motions. Smith can tell that Ivan is not aware that he is being
observed. Consequently, Ivan remains in the open making himself a
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splendid target for Smith. Smith slowly picks up his own rifle so as
not to make any noise himself and takes careful aim at Ivan. Once
he has Ivan in his sights, he squeezes his trigger finger thereby
pulling the trigger and shooting Ivan. Ivan dies a few short minutes
later.
Our first intuition is to claim that all four sentences describe
the same act. And, in a sense, we are right to do so. Nonetheless,
there are some curious problems in making that assertion. One thing
that might puzzle us is the relation between sentences p and s, for
example. While we might want to say that they both describe the same
state of affairs we also might have to admit, grudgingly, that s could
be considered a consequence of p. That is. Smith's killing Ivan is
the direct result of his squeezing the muscles in his trigger finger
in this case. Now, can we say that the consequence of an act is also
that same act? This surely sounds absurd. Nonetheless, we do not
want to claim that they are two separate acts. For it is a fact that
in squeezing his trigger finger Smith killed Ivan. What are we to say
about this? Well, one thing we might say is that it does not make
clear sense to say that action over a continuum may be divided up
neatly into a definitive set of acts. We only act for convenience as
if it could. In reality a segment of action we refer to as one act
may well overlap with a segment of action we refer to as another act.
The relation between sentences p through p seem to indicate this.
As a result, I think that it is fairly safe to conclude that no
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act" is completely separable from every other "act." Hence, it
is dangerous to assume that individual acts are atomic entities.
We use the notion of "act", then, as an arbitrary and artificial
delineator" to talk about particular aspects of an individual's over-
all action. It is more convenient to talk about a person's action in
terms of specific properties which may describe it at a particular time
or in terms of propositions which describe the states of affairs of
which the actions are a part. It is readily apparent that a particular
action or state of affairs can be described in a multitude of ways,
perhaps even in an infinite number of ways. Perhaps any action can
be described in a way that would make it seem morally right (per-
missible) under that description. Perhaps we could describe the
very same action in terms that make it seem morally unacceptable.
Our problem now is twofold. First, we must decide which of the
act descriptions are morally relevant and important. Second, we must
know if we are considering all of the morally relevant act descrip-
tions. Concerning future actions, we must decide which descriptions
of the action in terms of potential foreseeable results are probable
and also morally relevant. While we can foresee to a degree what
consequences will result, we are not always aware which are the most
probable or morally relevant.
Throughout the course of history there have been actions and
events of such magnitude and far-reaching effects that it is difficult
to assess them morally at all. Should we judge these events in terms
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of the more immediate consequences which resulted from the action or
in terms of the more far-reaching consequences which we are aware of
today? There have been any number of these events where the immediate
moral consequences were bad while the long-term moral consequences
may have been good and vice versa. The point 1 am trying to make is
that it is difficult to determine at which point in time it is fair
to judge the act. Do we judge the act in terms of (1) what is fore-
seen beforehand as probable, or (2) what is observed as an immediate
result or (3) what is observed as a residual consequence some time
later?
It seems to me we run into great problems when we begin to
classify an action in terms of its consequences. In our example
above, sentence r not only describes the same action as p but also
incorporates the consequences of doing p into the description. The
same relation holds between p and p. Our doing this makes it easy for
us to take the basic physical movement Smith makes and describe this
action in the terms of its consequences. The problem here is to
determine at what point it is no longer reasonable to describe Smith's
action in terms of its consequences. In certain cases we seem to beg
the question that an action is wrong by describing it in perjorative
terms. Now this may be ultimately a correct description of the action
in terms of what information we have about the action after it occurs.
However, it does not seem correct to me to claim that such a description
applies to the foreseen act unless the relation between the two des-
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criptions IS analytic and the agent is aware that they are. The fact
that a description may probably apply to one's act in the future depend-
ing on what, in fact, occurs is not a sufficient condition for us to
say that it is appropriate to describe that act in that particular way
at the earlier time.
We can see this more clearly if we consider the following example.
Suppose Sergeant Williams fires an antitank missile at a target some
2000 meters in the distance. There is an enemy position located at
the target, but the target is in the midst of a populated village. If
there are any civilians in the general vicinity of the target, they
will in all likelihood be killed or seriously injured when the missile
impacts on the target. Let's assume that Williams foresees this prob-
ability. Nonetheless, at the time he fires the missile Williams does
not consider his act a "killing of innocent civilians." In fact, the
correctness of this description is contingent on several factors which
are beyond Williams' control. First, innocent people must wander
into a location close enough to his target to be hurt. Second, the
missile must hit the target and detonate upon impact. Third, the
target must explode in such a way as to kill any innocent bystanders.
If all three of these conditions are met, then Williams will have
killed some innocent people but he will not have foreseen that killing
innocent people is a concommitant of firing the missile system.
Now we know from our earlier discussion that some deontologists
are committed to saying that particular actions are wrong because
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they conflict with some general prohibition against acts that pro-
duce consequences of a certain kind. Now, if the deontologist
judges Williams' action at the time he fires the missile, he cannot
say that Williams has violated any moral prohibitions.^^ For him to
say that Williams' action is wrong, he must say that Williams' action
is killing innocent people." But, he cannot say the act of "firing
the missile" is wrong because it has not produced the bad consequences
of killing innocent people yet. Instead, he must say that the act of
"firing the missile" is wrong because it is the same act as "killing
the innocent people." Yet, it is not clear the two are the same act
liiitil the deaths occur as a result of the missile's impacting on the
target. Clearly, then, an act that seems morally permissible under
one description becomes wrong only when it can be described as wrong
under another description. Williams' act, however, does not seem to
be wrong at the time he fires the missile because there seems to be
no correct description of his act at that time which makes it wrong.
"Overall" Actions and "Act-Components"
There is another curious relationship between an action and its
consequences. Once we describe an act in terms of its consequences,
that act becomes an "act-component" of the newly described act. In
our example "Williams' firing the missile" becomes an act-component
of "Williams' killing innocent people." If we think about it, every
act has innumerable act-components. Now, do act-components carry the
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same moral worth as the overall act they are a component of? One
would think they should. However, as we have seen, we are often
confused about whether we should assign the same moral worth to them
or not. For it all depends at what point in the agent's continuum of
action that we make the evaluation. Moreover, to make the evaluation
IS to make a moral evaluation on a segment of an agent's overall action
without considering its causes and, in turn, its effects. We fail to
consider it in relation to the overall continuum of action as a whole.
Deontologicalism and Consequences
Of course, foresight is merely the consideration of the truth of
a possible state of affairs at a particular time in the future. To
consider that state of affairs is to isolate it from all others
which describe the action. The agent isolates that state of affairs
in the sense that he morally evaluates it independently of the other
states of affairs which might apply to the same situation. So, in a
sense, the deontologist is a consequentialist in a bizarre way. In-
stead of considering some basic action and trying to weigh all of the
possible consequences of that action as does a utilitarian, he instead
considers all of the consequences of a simple physical action which
might be incorporated into a correct description of that same act and
then checks to see which of these act descriptions are such that the
act under that description violates his moral rules. If the act can
be described in terms of any of its consequences in a way so that the
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act can be said to violate a moral rule, then the act is wrong and
impermissible. Hence, for a deontologist consequences are important,
but only insofar as they affect the act description. One way of
looking at deontologicalism, then, is that an act is permissible
until we are able to describe it as an act which violates a moral
rule
.
Seen in this light, we can begin to see one major problem with
deontological theories which will also provide troubles for the PDE.
Almost any act we can think of can probably be described in such a
way that we would think it to be wrong under that description. To
demonstrate this problem let's consider an action which we would
normally consider innocuous. Suppose Corporal Allen is in the act of
digging a foxhole. He is merely shoveling dirt out of a hole in the
ground to prepare his fighting position. Now most of us would probably
say that there is nothing wrong with this action. However, Allen is
employed as a mercenary in an army which fights for a known war cri-
minal. In fact, while Allen has committed no atrocities himself,
other soldiers in other units of the same army have. The cause for
which the army Allen is fighting is unquestionably unjust and Allen
knows this. Now we could describe Allen's actions in the following
way:
t: Allen is contributing to a morally unjust cause.
u: Allen is willfully failing to stop atrocities.
Under these descriptions Allen is acting wrongly by digging the fox-
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hole. Yet, I think we are at least hesitant in this case to say that
Allen’s action is morally wrong. While we would have to agree that t
and u are consequences of his digging the foxhole, we would not want to
say that their incorporation into the act description has any bearing
on the moral worth of digging the foxhole.
Single Agency versus Collective Agency
Having examined only acts that have a single agent, we can see
that complex actions in which more than one agent is involved will be
just as problematic. These actions can be difficult to assess because
it IS difficult to establish agency for the action and its resultant
consequence. Is one agent the agent of the overall action or is the
O O
collective group the agent? If we say that a particular agent
within a group effort is responsible for the action, then we must
claim that his sub-action is key in the overall action. But this
is not always so. It may be that if some other individual failed to
perform his sub-action, then the overall action would not occur. So,
it would not be correct in these cases to attribute agency to a single
individual. However, on the other hand, if we attribute some sort of
collective agency to the group then we must consider how this collective
agent "foresees" and "intends" acts. I contend that what each indi-
vidual intends or foresees as a result of the action he contributes
may well be very different from his fellow contributors. We are faced
with several intentions in just one overall action. In light of this.
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It does not seem to make much sense to talk about collective foresight
and intention.
In a collective action the matter of determining which descrip-
tions of the action are morally relevant is greatly exacerbated. For
now we are not merely concerned with each of the individual's per-
ceptions about his relation to his own sub-action under any number of
act descriptions which apply to it, but are also concerned with his
perception about the relation of his sub-action to the overall-action,
his perception about the nature of the other contributing agents' sub-
actions to the overall action, and his beliefs what the sub-actions
entail as opposed to what the overall action entails. It is fairly
obvious that these factors make application of the PDF extremely
complex and difficult. For each of the contributing agents can and
probably do have different beliefs about the nature of their own
actions, their fellow contributor's actions and the overall action
in general.
I will discuss these problems in greater detail in the next
chapter. By the use of several fairly common examples of action in
war, I intend to show that the PDF is unhelpful in deliberating
whether these actions are right or wrong. We will see that under the
PDF, seemingly innocuous acts can be shown to be morally wrong and
heinous crimes can be shown to be permissible. Let's consider these
problems now.
CHAPTER IV
SOME BASIC PROBLEMS FOR THE PDE
A Short Review
We have already seen that it is difficult to discuss the notions
of intention and foreseeability without understanding something of the
problems with action theory and the limitations of human perceptions.
In this chapter I intend to show how these two factors combine to make
It difficult for us to make much sense of the PDE. Depending on how
we understand the relation of intention and foresight to action, we
may come away with moral conclusions which run contrary to our most
basic intuitions. Some acts which we normally would consider wrong
come out, according to the PDE, as permissible whereas some acts we
normally consider permissible are according to it, quite wrong. More-
over, if we attempt to remove the ambiguity from this doctrine we
find that either the doctrine is so strict that virtually no act in
war is permissible or it is so loose that almost any act in war may
be deemed permissible provided that the agent has a "good intention"
and that the good consequences compensate for the bad consequences.
So far we have considered some important aspects of foresight
and intention which play an important role in our moral decisions.
First, we have been concerned about how the agent perceives a
situation. We know he has certain beliefs about what his action is
and what will be its consequences. We also know that these beliefs
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are limited by any number of external factors to include the agent's
physical environment and the actions of other agents. The consequences
of an agent's action can be foreseen, but foreseen with less than full
certainty. Essentially, the same limitations apply to the notion of
intention.
A second important consideration in applying the PDE is that of
time. We are concerned not only with how much time an agent has to
decide and then act in a given situation, but also with the time in
the action continuum at which the agent has his intentional attitudes.
Time places limitations on an agent's decision-making capability and
it plays an important role in determining what intention is
appropriate for what action.
Third, how the agent envisions or describes the intended action
or foreseen consequences is an important factor in determining if the
action is morally appropriate for achieving the desired consequences.
The more detailed picture an agent has of his intended act and its
foreseen consequences
,
the more adept he is going to be in seeing that
the act is morally right, or morally wrong. We find that many of the
controversial cases in our discussion of the PDE concern those actions
where the agent (1) intends a somewhat ill-defined action and foresees
some specific states of affairs as a consequence, or (2) intends a
specific and well-defined action but is unclear as to the specifics
of the foreseen consequences or, (3) intends an ill-defined action
and foresees only general unspecified results.
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Some Additional Considerations
Finally, three other factors come to play that I have not yet
discussed. The first factor has to do with the agent’s rationality
and mental competency. If the agent is insane or is unable to think
at a level of intelligence that we would expect of most human beings,
then we are going to be less apt to say that this agent is one to
whom the PDE applies. For if a person's perception of reality is
seriously distorted or impaired, then we may not think that he is
capable of making the moral distinctions necessary for applying
the PDE. Hence, we may not hold an agent morally responsible for
his acts and intentions (under the PDE) if he is not rational and
mentally competent.
The second additional factor has to do with actions in which
more than one agent is required for an action to be done. As we
all know, certain actions are group efforts in which each agent makes
a separate contribution to the act but the overall act cannot be
performed without all these sub-actions being done at roughly the
same time. In performing his sub-action, each agent may have a
intention and foresight with respect to his own action
and that action's consequences than any other cooperating agent
has with respect to his action and its consequences. It is a matter
of concern for us to determine which, if any, of these individuals'
intentional attitudes are appropriate for assessing the overall act.
The last additional factor that plays a role here is that of
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habit. By ’’habits" I mean an action that an agent performs custom-
arily without reflecting on it when certain circumstances occur. I
take certain actions that are inculcated by training and experience
to be habitual. For example, a well-trained soldier will habitually
dive for cover when he hears an explosion or small arms fire. He
also will take overt aggressive action in certain other situations.
While we are probably inclined to call these actions intentional,
we may still find it difficult to determine what the agent considers
the consequences of his action, if he considers the consequences at
all. Many habitual actions are instantaneous responses to stimuli.
In some relatively minor cases, the agent often is not even aware
that he is performing the action, let alone considering the con-
sequence of it. In combat situations many habitual actions are
performed as a self-defense measure. There is no other intention
than survival. That intention moreover, is unlikely to have been
mulled over. Indeed, such action is almost Pavlovian in nature.
A Review of the PDF
Before considering some examples which I think pose problems for
the PDF, we ought to refresh our memory on some of the stipulations of
the PDF. To make this possible, I will present a truncated version of
the PDF I presented in the first chapter. I will do this merely as a
convenience to help us focus our attention on the part of the PDF that
I think is most important. So, for the purposes of this discussion I
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will drop the third and fourth condition of the earlier version and
simply assume that our examples fulfill those two conditions. The
revised version of the PDE now looks like this:
PDE : It is morally permissible for an agent to
perform an act which has both good and bad
consequences if and only if ( 1 ) The act itself
IS morally good or at least indifferent and
(2) The agent does not positively will (intend)
the bad effect but merely permits it.
Condition (1) is the requirement that the action, as intended, must
be such that it is not intrinsically evil. The intended action must
be either morally good or morally neutral. Condition (2) says that
the agent must not intend the bad consequences even though they are
foreseen. In foreseeing these consequences, he merely allows them to
occur. He is not required to do anything to prevent them nor is he
required to intend that the bad consequences not occur. The agent is
merely required to withhold his intention of producing these bad
effects. By withhold ' I mean that he fails to have an intention
either of producing the bad consequences or preventing them.
A Closer Look at Condition (1) of the PDE
While this version of the PDE may seem acceptable upon a cursory
look, I think a closer examination by us will help us see why it is
unclear and not particularly helpful. The first condition is parti-
cularly problematic. Having discussed the problem of delineating
acts and their consequences we can see better why this condition is
troublesome. What do we mean when we say the "act itself is morally
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good?" As we know the "act" can take on any number of descriptions.
These descriptions can range from talk about an agent's own basic
physical movements all the way to talk of the most far-reaching
consequences of this basic physical action. For instance, if we
say the "act itself" is the agent's squeezing his finger then we
are prone to say that it is at least "morally neutral." On the
other hand, if we say that the "act itself" is "shooting an innocent
child," then we are apt to say it is morally wrong.
As we have already seen, under deontological moral theory an act
IS wrong if It falls under a description which makes it as described
a violation of a moral rule. But if all the acts we are considering
have some bad results, then each "act itself" can be described as
morally bad. Hence, if we read the first condition as saying that
the act under any description must be good, then we have made it
virtually impossible for any such act to be accepted as permissible
under the PDF. This is not, however, what 1 think the framers of
the PDE intended. For they were very much concerned that certain
acts of killing in war should be accepted as morally permissible.
In order to avoid the difficulty mentioned above we might instead
read the act itself" as meaning only the basic bodily movements the
agent himself performs in producing the action. Yet this interpreta-
tion is also problematic. We can describe almost any human action
this way without violating any moral rules. We do not say that a
person's squeezing his finger is morally wrong: we say it is the
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result of the agent squeezing his finger that is wrong. The physical
act is wrong because it can be described in terms of its evil con-
sequences
.
It seems to me that we need to find some middle ground between
these two extremes which captures the moral intuition that the
advocates of the PDE are trying to convey. On the one hand, condition
(1) can be read as such a strict condition that no actions with bad
consequences are permissible under the PDE while, on the other hand,
it can be read so loosely that virtually any action is morally per-
missible under the PDE. Perhaps we ought to consider "the act itself"
in terms of how the agent himself envisions it. We said earlier that
beliefs and intentions are about states of affairs (or propositions).
Moreover, we said that different formulations of these states of
affairs describe our actions differently. Moreover, we have indicated
that it is possible to hold different beliefs or intentions about what
is, objectively speaking, the same state of affairs. For instance, I
can intend to shoot at a silhouette of a person approaching my position,
thinking it to be that of an enemy soldier, without intending to shoot
my company commander, whose silhouette it actually is.
So, it appears that "the act itself" must refer to a specific
state of affairs that the agent believes will come about or intends
to bring about by doing the action. The action, then, must be
morally good as the agent intends it. We have now added the subjective
element to our condition one. It is not so important that the intended
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state of affairs may be expressed as a moral wrong. Instead, the
agent's belief about what state of affairs he is producing is of
critical importance. The state of affairs that his action is directed
towards must not be in violation of some moral prohibition. With that
in mind, let's reformulate our condition (l) of the PDE in the
following way:
(1 ) The action as intended by the agent is morally good
or at least morally indifferent.
This reformulation seems to capture the intuitions of those who con-
ceived the PDE much better than condition (1) does. By the phrase
"as intended by the agent" I mean under the description the agent con-
ceives the intended action. Thus, according to condition (1') the
action must be morally good (neutral) according to the description the
agent considers it under when he intends it.
A Closer Look at Condition (2) of the PDE
Let's now turn our attention to the second condition, especially
to the phrase "the agent .. .merely permits it (the bad effect)." We
might be tempted at first to attack condition (2) by saying that the
act of "permitting" is itself a form of intentional action. That is,
when we "permit" some evil foreseen consequences, we have intended not
to prevent them. By attacking the PDE this way, however, I think we
are being a bit unfair to it.^*^ We are denying the proponent of the PDE
the very distinction upon which the PDE is grounded, the distinction
between the intended and the merely permitted. The proponent of the
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PDE would most probably deny that in permitting these bad consequences
the agent intends not to prevent them. He would probably say that
the agent entertains no intentions at all with respect to the bad
consequences. He neither intends them nor intends not to prevent
them.
While we have eliminated that particular objection to the
second condition, I think that another issue regarding it warrants
discussion. Condition (2), as I have already stated, is predicted
upon the distinction between intending bad consequences and merely
permitting them. I think that it is reasonable to say that the
deontologist proponent of the PDE wants to claim that intentionally
bringing about bad consequences is morally worse than merely per-
mitting them. Looking at this distinction another way, we might say
that acting to bring about bad consequences is worse than failing to
act to prevent them. But, if we look at the distinction this way, it
would appear that intention does not play as central a role in the PDE
as we might like to think. Instead the theory seems to turn on a dis-
tinction between acts and omissions. If this is, in fact, the case,
then the PDE proponent is commited to the view that there is a moral
difference between our duties not commit intentional wrongs and our
duties to perform good acts. By saying that it is worse to bring
about evil by acting than to bring it about by failing to act, he
is saying (in an oblique way) that our duties to refrain from doing
evil acts are greater than our duties to perform good acts.
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Now we can begin to see the dilemma condition (2) places us
in. In most of Western society we accept the view that we have both
a negative duty n^ to kill and we also have a positive duty to save
lives. If we accept condition (2) as it stands, we are saying that
the agent must not intend the bad consequences (i.e., killing innocent
civilians). But, in permitting the deaths of innocent poeple, we
are failing in our duty to save lives. If we suppose that our act
as we intend it is good and that it brings about an early end to a
war, thereby preventing many needless deaths in the long run, then
by intending the "good" act and "permitting" its bad consequences,
we have both fulfilled our duty to save lives and have failed in
our duty to save lives. Looking at it another way, we have said
that our duty not to kill takes precedence over our duty to save
lives. In general, then, our duties not to commit intentional wrongs
take precedence over our duties to perform good acts.
For me, this conclusion is counter~intuitive
. There are many
occasions on which I believe that an agent is obligated to perform
some positive act even if it means that he violates some duty to
refrain from doing an evil act. My intuition is that positive and
negative duties should have equal status. But, if they do have
equal status, then our only means of resolving conflicts between
positive and negative duties seems to be through some sort of
utilitarian calculation of the consequences.
One way to avoid the conclusion above is to alter condition
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(2) so that does not turn on the distinction between doing good and
refraining from doing evil. We might do this in the following way:
(2') The agent has no intention with respect to the bad
consequences of his intended action, even though heforesees them as likely.
In this revised version of condition (2), the agent must withhold his
intention with respect to the bad effects. He must neither intend
them nor intend them to be permitted.
Unfortunately, if we now accept condition (2'), we are faced with
a problem of a different sort. In requiring the agent to have no
intention whatsoever with regard to the foreseen bad consequences of
his action, we may be asking too much of him psychologically. In
essence, what we are saying to the agent is, "Even though you foresee
the killing of innocent people as a probable consequence of the action
as you intend it, you cannot intend killing them nor can you intend not
to prevent their deaths." I suggest that it is psychologically im-
possible to perform all three of these mental acts at the same time.
If the agent believes that particular bad consequences are likely to
result from his action and yet goes ahead with that action, then he has
tacitly intended to permit those bad consequences.
A Reformulation of the PDE
It now appears that we are in a difficult situation. If we accept
condition (2) then, we must say that, for example, our duty not to kill
takes precedence over our duty to save lives. As we have seen this is
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not a particularly satisfactory alternative. On the other hand, if
we accept condition (2'), then we require the agent to perform a
psychologically impossible feat. In summary, then, (2) requires us
to accept a counter-intuitive moral concept while (2') requires us
to accept the idea that a psychologically impossible feat is possible.
Neither alternative, then, is particularly attractive. What now you
ask? Well, perhaps we ought to grudgingly stick with condition (2)
and see where it leads us in terms of practical examples. Con-
sequently, let's clean up PDE^ and reformulate it this way:
2
PDE : It is morally permissible for an agent to perform
an act which has both good and bad consequences
if and only if (1) the action, as intended by
the agent is morally good, or at least morally
neutral and (2) the agent does not intend the
bad effect as a direct consequence of his action
but merely permits it.
As I have stated before, 1 am not particularly happy with this formula-
tion of the PDE. However, 1 can think of no better formulation which
eliminates the problems I have already enumerated.
Let's press on and see how this version of the PDE stands up to
some difficult practical problems. I will discuss four cases that 1
believe that the PDE should resolve, but which cannot.
Nine Factors that Affect the PDE
Before looking at these examples, though, I would like briefly to
review some of the major factors that I feel play a part in how an
action is evaluated under the PDE. These factors are:
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(1) How specifically the agent envisions his intended action
and its foreseen consequences.
(2) How much the agent knows of (and perceives as relevant)
the circumstances surrounding his action.
(3) How much moral emphasis the agent gives to each of
the alternatives he sees as available to him.
(4) How rational and mentally competent the agent is.
(5) How much time the agent has available to make his decision.
(6) How much stress the agent is under when making his decision.
(7) Whether or not the agent is reacting to the situation in
a habitual manner.
(8) How much of a role other actors play in the agent's action.
(9) Whether the agent's intent is to perform some positive act
or refrain from performing some positive act.
The "No-Win" Situation
My first example concerns cases in which the agent is caught in a
"no-win" situation. That is, there are situations in which the agent
is confronted with only two basic alternatives. Either he performs a
particular action or he does not. If he performs the deed, he will
bring about good and bad consequences. If he does not perform it, he
will also bring about good and evil consequences.
Perhaps this example will aid us in seeing this point. An army
unit is defending one of its country's own cities. Instead of leaving
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their homes and becoming refugees, many of the civilian populace have
decided to remain in the city with this army unit. Perhaps they feel
more protected in doing so. However, in the course of a larger battle
the city is surrounded by enemy forces who begin preparation to assault
the city. The enemy army is known for its brutal treatment of both
military and civilian prisoners. They have committed all sorts of
crimes against innocent civilians in the past, including murder,
pillaging, plundering and the like. The commander of the army unit
charged with the defense of the city is faced with two basic alter-
natives. Either he orders his army to fight or he orders his army
to capitulate. Let s assume that either action might be considered
good under the description which the commander intends to perform
them. Moreover, his intended direct result of choosing either
alternative is other than to produce the harm of civilians. However,
it is foreseeable (or perhaps even certain) that widespread civilian
harm will result from either alternative. The choice boils down to
either fighting and bringing about harm to civilians or capitulating
(not fighting) and bringing about harm to civilians. In either case
the harm done to the civilians is a direct result of his decision.
As we already know from our previous discussion, the PDE is
supposed to aid us in deciding which acts among our alternatives are
permissible and which are not. However, if all the alternatives we
have open to us are such that in order to perform any of them we
must intend an action which produces some bad results, then our
decision seems to come down to a matter of deciding which of the
two evil consequences is preferable. It comes down, that is, to
some form of utilitarianism. This is what seems to be the case in
the example. Instead of focusing on the moral worth of the commander'
two alternative actions, we must shift our consideration to the con-
sequences of the action.
A deontologist, in order to avoid this result, seems to have only
two possible replies here. The first thing he might say is that he
admits there are these "no-win" situations in life where the agent is
committed to doing wrong whichever alternative he chooses. He might
add that even though these situations do occur, that does not mean
that the PDE is not useful for many other situations.
The deontologist' s other alternative is to say that in situations
like this what is important is whether the agent produces the evil
by a positive intentional act or by intentionally refraining from
doing that act. In our example case, he must say that there is a
putative moral difference between fighting and not fighting (capitu-
lating). Perhaps he might say that not fighting is the correct alter-
native in the example case because the commander and his men do not
actively bring about the bad consequences. The enemy does.
Whatever reply the deontologist makes here, he has weakened his
position. If he makes the first reply, he admits that the PDE can
give no guidance in terms of the relative moral worth of two actions,
be they good or bad. The PDE merely assists us in determining
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whether acts are permissible or impermissible. The commander in
our example must perform one of the two alternatives. By not doing
the one he necessarily does the other. To tell him it is impermissible
to do either of the acts is no help whatsoever. If the deontologist
makes the second reply by saying that there is a moral difference
between acting and refraining, then he places himself on very
controversial philosophical ground. 1 have already given my
opinion on this matter earlier in the chapter.
The Problem of Taking Moral Risks
A similar yet separate problem to the one 1 just discussed is
what 1 call the problem of moral risk taking. Often in combat
soldiers must take dangerous risks to perform good acts. In fact
such acts of bravery are encouraged to a degree. However, if the
PDE makes a moral distinction between acting and refraining from
acting, then in essence it implies that we not take moral risks.
To see what 1 mean let's consider this example.
Private Hill has been wounded seriously in a fire fight. Sergeant
Ramos sees that Hill is wounded badly and realizes that Hill must be
evacuated immediately or he will probably die. However, to get Hill
to safety Ramos must first drag Hill across an open area. The chance
of both of them being shot and killed in this open area is also fairly
high. If Ramos intends to save Hill's life, then we would probably
say that this is a morally good action. But, then again, we would not
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say that he would be acting in a morally wrong manner if he left Hill
alone, considering the risk involved. It is fairly clear that if
Ramos intends to save Hill's life some bad consequences are likely to
occur. On the other hand, if Ramos intends not to save Hill’s life
some bad consequences are also likely to occur. Many of us would
probably say that since there is a chance of saving Hill's life by
getting him out of the location he presently is in, this course of
action IS at least morally permissible, if not preferable to the
other course of action. PDE advocates, however, are in the uncom-
fortable position of saying that it is morally preferable for Ramos
to take no physical action with regard to Hill. Letting Hill die
is better than causally contributing to his death. This seems to
me to be plainly counter-intuitive. Almost any action where harm is
risked to prevent harm from coming about falls into this category.
Clearly, we would like to keep this kind of option open to moral
agents. The deontologist who supports the PDE says this is not an
acceptable option.
The Problem of Non-Specific Intentions
The third type of problem case that the PDE is unable to resolve
adequately is that situation where the agent is not sure what his
specific intention is in an action. In the second chapter I character-
ized an intention as a disposition to act. And I said that we have a
disposition to act in a particular manner when we suppose we are in
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special circumstances that warrant our acting in that manner. As I
also pointed out in that chapter, one of the most critical problems
of justifying our intentions, and consequently our behavior, is that
of insuring that we are, in fact, in the appropriate circumstances
which trigger our intentions. Now, this problem is not merely an
epistemological problem. It is not just a matter of being skeptical
about what our senses seem to tell us is the case. It is also a
matter of what things we do and do not perceive, what emphasis
we place on each particular perception we do have, and in which
way we put all these perceptions together into a "complete picture"
of the situation.
We have all been in situations at some time or other where we
have performed an action which, after reflecting on it, we were
not sure what our intention was in doing the action. In combat
this type of situation is relatively commonplace. The agent's per-
ception can be obstructed in any number of ways. For instance, both
the enemy's tactics and the effects of the weapons the enemy uses
serve to obfuscate what is actually occurring. We can imagine
situations where the agent has a fairly general intention in mind
which his action will satisfy. Moreover, we can imagine that he
foresee some general consequence which may be construed as evil.
Nonetheless, his action will, in fact, be a different one than he
had intended and its evil consequences will be different ones than he
had foreseen. Let's consider a practical situation which exemplifies
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this problem.
Let's suppose that a certain commander receives an intelligence
report that informs him that an enemy battalion is occupying a stra-
tegically located town. He knows that if he can destroy, or at least
effectively defeat, that battalion, then it will be to his own unit's
great advantage. Perhaps the enemy is in a position to disrupt his
own tactical activities.
Now, let's also imagine that our commander knows only that an
enemy battalion is in that town. He does not know which enemy unit
It IS, what kind it is, nor who any of the individuals are in that
battalion. In drawing up this plan he states only the intention of
attacking and destroying "the enemy battalion" located in the town.
Let's also suppose that our commander foresees that some innocent
civilians located in the town will be killed by his action. His fore-
sight is also somewhat non-specific. He foresees only that the
potential innocent victims of his action are "occupants" of the town.
Again, he does not envision them as "lifelong residents of the town"
or as specific individuals who reside in the town.
In our example, we will make believe that some curious things
happen the night before our commander is due to attack the town. A
battle erupts in the sector adjacent to our commander's. As a result
of that battle, the enemy unit in the town redeploys to reinforce
other enemy units already fighting the battle. Unbeknownst to our
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commander, the enemy battalion moves out of the town he is supposed
to attack the next day. (The raging battle engages his intelligence
sources and distracts them from observing the town that night.)
Let’s also say that the battlefield noises and smoke veiled the noise
of the enemy battalion’s movement and blocked any visual observation
of it.
That very night the civilians located in the town, rightfully
fearing for their own lives, decide to evacuate the town. All of
them leave. Our commander is not aware of this fact either. So,
let us imagine that the town is unoccupied for a short period of time.
Later that night, however, another enemy battalion moves into
the town to replace the now deployed battalion. It reoccupies the
positions the other battalion had held. In addition, a large number
of civilian refugees fleeing the ensuing battle also filter into the
town looking for shelter. We will suppose that there are many more
of these civilians than there were in the town before. Once again,
we will also imagine that these events go unnoticed by our commander.
It is now early the next morning and the commander has his
unit poised and ready to attack the town. He still has the intention
of attacking and destroying ”an enemy battalion” and he still fore-
sees that ’’innocent civilians” will be killed in the town as an
unintended side effect of his attack. Nonetheless, the specific
individuals upon whom the intention and foresight are directed
have completely changed.
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At 0430 hours that morning the commander orders the attack.
In the following melee the commander does accomplish his mission.
His intention of destroying the enemy battalion is accomplished.
Let's say that this action is at least morally indifferent, or
perhaps better in that it will serve to shorten the war and, as
a result fewer lives will be lost overall and less damage will be
done to the area where the war is being fought. Just to be safe,
we will also say it is morally good in terms of some short-range
moral consequences.
Unfortunately, despite the good consequence, the act also
produces some very bad "side effects." Due to the fact that a
large number of civilians are present in the town, many of them are
also killed in the battle. Some are killed by artillery fire that
impacts on the buildings in which they are hiding while many others
panic and are killed in the exchange of fire between the two units when
they try to escape. Because of the smoke, noise, and limited light,
many of them are mistaken as soldiers moving about in the town and are
gunned down.
What are we to say about this episode with respect to the PDE?
I think in several respects it is difficult to see exactly how the
PDE applies here. First of all, it is confusing just who the inten-
tional objects of our commander's attack are. Did our commander
intend to destroy the unit that moved out of the town or did he intend
to destroy the unit that replaced it? His intention of "destroying
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the enemy battalion" is not specific enough for us to determine which
unit the commander meant. Any unit that fits the description of being
an enemy battalion would have been satisfactory as the object of the
commander's intention (even an enemy medical battalion).
The same sort of thing could also be said about the commander's
foresight as to who would probably be killed as a result of his
action. His foresight that "innocent civilians" in the town would
be killed could apply to a wide range of people who were unlucky
enough to be in that town at the wrong time.
In one sense we are tempted to say the PDE applies here and that
the commander's action has met our criterion. However, in another
sense, many of us might be reluctant to say that the commander actually
intended to destroy the battalion that he did or that he "foresaw"
the deaths of the civilians that were killed. His intent and foresight
were just not specific enough to say what he intended or foresaw. That
is, we tend to think of intention and foresight applying to specific
people, things, and situations. For example, I intend to write this
sentence with this particular black pencil that I am holding in my
left hand, on this particular piece of paper, and at this particular
time. We are also tempted to say that the commander's stated intention
and foresight really do not qualify as a true intention and foresight.
If we make the claim that the commander's intention and foresight
are not specific enough and claim that one must have more specific
intentions and foresights in mind, then we run into a difficult problem.
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That problem is how to determine that the described object of one's
intention is specific enough to meet the criteria of the PDE. In our
example case we might want to say that the commander had to know
specifically which unit he intended to destroy and which group of
people he foresaw were going to die as a consequence of his attack.
But, surely this is an absurd, if not impossible demand to make in
many cases. It requires us, for instance, to determine just what
unit is attacking us (if we are attacked) before we fight back. It
also requires us to determine moment to moment just who our potential
victims are. In war that is, practically speaking, impossible. To
have a perfectly specific intention we would have to know who each
and every individual involved in the situation is. Surely, we do
not want to require that! So we are caught in a dilemma. Do we
allow "non-specific" intentions and foresight to count and thereby
"ambiguate" the PDE or do we require "strictly specific" intentions
and foresight thereby precluding any action under the PDE in
situations where we are not sure exactly of what we intend or
foresee? And, if so, where do we draw the line between "specific"
and "non-specific" intentions?
The important point here is that the individual who advocates
the PDE must be willing to agree that either the PDE does not apply
to all situations in which good and bad consequences are produced
or that some questionable assumptions with regard to agent inten-
tions must be made. If he agrees that the first disjunct is true.
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then he admits that practical application of the PDE is much more
restricted than he might like to admit. That is, it does not apply
to many cases in which he would be tempted to use it. On the other
hand, if he wants to say that the PDE applies to all actions that
have good and bad consequences, then he has to make some basic pre-
sumptions about all action which are not necessarily true. These
presumptions are that a conscientious moral agent will always (1) be
able to consider alternative actions and consequences and that it is
to his moral advantage to do so and (2) be able to think of his
intended action and consequences in specific enough terms so that it
is not ambiguous as to whom or what they are directed. 1 think that
it is dangerous to make either of these assumptions. So it seems
that whichever disjunct the PDE advocate chooses here, he should
agree that either of them substantially undermines the scope and
force of the PDE.
The Problem of "Collective” Intention
The last type of problem case I would like to discuss is that in
which an action requires multiple agents. We can think of innumerable
situations where this is the case. Of these many situations two types
seem to stand out. First, there are those cases where a group of
individuals must act simultaneously for an action to be performed. A
bomber crew in the process of accomplishing its mission is a good
example of this. One man must be flying the aircraft, one man must
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be navigating it to the proper target, and one man must be prepared
to drop the bombs once the aircraft gets to its target. If any of
these simultaneous efforts are absent then the specific action cannot
be completed. For the airplane must be flying to drop the bombs, it
must be in the correct location to destroy the proper target and some
one must drop the bombs when the aircraft is over the target.
The second situation I want to consider is that in which a chain
of action must occur in order for some overall action to occur. This
is an especially problematic situation when different agents perform
different actions in this chain of action. The kind of specific
situation I have in mind is that where the chain is initiated by an
individual who has one intention, foreseeing certain consequences,
and is completed by an individual who has another intention, fore-
seeing different consequences. This type of case might occur when
a general gives an order with the overall perspective as to how the
ordered action is to fit in with the overall circumstances. Yet,
his order is executed by individuals who may have very limited
perspectives as to how the action is to fit in with the overall
situation. We can see that this perspective may be distorted with
the addition of intermediaries between the general and the persons
who carry out his orders. One situation that illustrates this idea
well is that case in which an Air Force general orders a missile to
be fired on a particular target. The order is then passed down
through the chain of command until it reaches a particular missile
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crew located inside a missile silo. The crew, however, is aware
only that the missile will be directed at an enemy target; which
one they do not know.
The Bomber Crew Example
Now that we have identified what 1 take to be two problematic
cases, let's take a closer look at each one of them. Suppose that a
bomber crew has been given the mission to bomb a particular industrial
complex deep in the enemy country's heartland. (We will assume that
the enemy country was the aggressor in this war and that without the
industrial capabilities provided by this complex the enemy will not
be able to continue fighting the war.) However, there is one parti-
cular problem. This industrial complex borders on a large inhabited
residential area. In the act of destroying the industrial complex,
the bomber crew will undoubtedly damage some of the residential area,
thereby killing and injuring some of the civilian residents of the
area
.
Each member of the crew has the intention of performing his
own particular duties which must be performed if the action is to
occur. Each crew member also intends that the mission of dropping
the bombs is completed satisfactorily. Moreover, they all also
foresee that some innocent civilians will be killed. When they
reach the target each member of the crew performs his particular
sub-action, the bombs fall on the complex and destroy it. A number
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of innocent civilians are killed as a result.
My concern in this example is not with the intention involved here,
but instead with just who or what agent has the intention. If we
concern ourselves merely with the actual dropping of the bombs on the
target, we probably would point to the bombadier and say that he is
the fellow who has performed the action. But clearly it is unfair to
charge only the bombadier with the action, especially if it has large-
scale bad effects. He has not acted in a vacuum. His being able to
perform the act of dropping the bombs is dependent on the appropriate
action of other members of the crew. Similarly, if we try to blame
either the pilot or the navigator individually we run into the same
problem. It seems, then, that the action must be attributed to the
crew as a whole. But as Joseph Margolis put it:
Nothing can perform an act or have an interest
that is not at the very least alive, sentient,
intelligent. Human beings singly or aggre-
gatively, satisfy these conditions. But a
collective entity--a corporation, for instance--
can onljr^have interests imputed to it by human
agents
.
Margolis is saying, essentially, the corporations or bomber crews
are fictitious entities. It is only in a manner of speaking that
we can attribute intentions to them. To attribute an intention in
reality to a bomber crew or corporation is an error. For bomber
crews and corporations are not thinking beings. So to say that
"the bomber crew intends to bomb an industrial complex" is not
literally true.
101
Where does this leave us? On one hand we want to say that it
IS unfair to attribute the intention for the whole action on any
one individual in the crew while on the other hand we want to say
that it is not correct to say that the intention lies with the
bomber crew, as a collective entity, either.
Now, the PDE seems to be designed so that we can presuppose
that collective agents intend, foresee, act, etc. However, 1 think
this is an unsatisfactory supposition for the foregoing reasons. We
cannot assume that "collective intentions" are representative of the
sum of individual intentions of the persons who compose this group.
The Missile Silo Example
Another way to look at this problem is by considering the case
where the overall action is such that several different agents each
contribute an individual sub-action in a chain of action. As in our
second example, let's suppose that a general gives the order for a
missile to be fired on some military target. He intends for that
military target to be destroyed. However, he also foresees that a
number of civilians may be killed by the detonation of the missile
on its target. We will assume that the general does not know which
specific missile will be fired to accomplish this task. Nonetheless,
the general does know what impact the firing of the missile is to
have on the overall situation, as he is aware of it. That is, the
firing of this missile plays a part in a grand strategy which he.
but none of his subordinates, is aware of.
Let's say now that this order is given to some lesser-ranking
general in charge of the missile units. We will say that this
general's understanding of the use of the missile in the overall
strategy is less comprehensive than his superior's but he still has
a pretty good idea what the intended effect is to be. This general
however, does know which specific unit under his command he will
assign the task of firing the missile. He does not know which
missile will be fired, though.
This general who is in charge of the missile units then passes
the order to the specific missile unit commander, a colonel, who ha
virtually no idea of the "grand strategy" but knows which missile
crew to assign the mission. His foresight of the effects of firing
the missile at the target is far less comprehensive than the two
generals. This colonel in turn orders the captain in charge of
the crew to arm and fire the missile. While the captain controls
the overall procedure in the missile silo, one of his subordinates,
a certain lieutenant, will actually perform the launch procedures.
We will assume that neither the captain nor the lieutenant knows
specifically where the missile is targeted. They know only that
it is aimed at some enemy military target. Their intention then
is to perform a successful launch of the missile at an unknown
enemy target.
It should be becoming clear now what the problem is here. If
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the missile is successfully launched and destroys the enemy target,
then we have an interesting problem with regard to the PDE. The
individual who initiates the overall action by giving the command
that a specific target be destroyed, thereby foreseeing the resultant
deaths of innocent civilians, does not perform the actual firing of
the missile nor does he even know which missile is to be fired. On
the other hand, the person who completes the action by firing the
missile has a much more limited intention in doing so than the
original general. Moreover, his foresight in the matter is ex-
tremely limited, since he is ignorant of where the missile is
targeted and for what reasons it is being used.
Once again the PDE gives us no real assistance in the consider-
ation of the overall action. For, we are not talking of a single
agent performing the entire action. The intention of the general
who initiates the action is not the same as that of the lieutenant
who eventually performs the action. In addition, what the general
foresees is much different than what the lieutenant foresees.
We can safely say here that the lieutenant's act would not be
performed if the general did not give the order. The general's
intention is inextricably linked to the lieutenant's action. But,
we do not want to say what the general intends is what the lieutenant
intends. That is, the lieutenant's action is not caused by the
general's intention, at least not in any direct sense. The consider-
ations the general entertains in giving the order are not those that
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the lieutenant entertains in carrying out the order. So, if we
try to consider the entire chain of action as a single overall
action we have a difficult problem in connecting the intention that
is involved in the overall action with the intentions in each of
the sub-actions which make up the overall action.
If we consider the general's sub-action and the lieutenant's sub-
action as two separate and causally related actions, then we run
into a problem of a different sort. The general's action is merely
one of ordering and its consequences is that of bringing about certain
actions on the part of his subordinates. The problem, however, is
that although we say that his order induces these subordinates to
perform certain actions, the subordinates at each level have the
option of either following or not following the order. So, it is
not as if the general directly and unavoidably causes the ultimate
consequences of his action. The consequences are not the necessary
results of his action. So, it is difficult to morally judge the
permissibility of the general's action.
The lieutenant, on the other hand, is in a position such that
he does not intend the specific action the general does nor does he
foresee the bad consequences of his action in the specific way the
general does. Earlier, when I discussed the notion of foresight,
I stated that we normally think that an agent has done no moral
wrong if he could not foresee the bad effects of his performing an
action. In the lieutenant's case he is in an epistemically blind
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position with regard to the specific consequences of his action. He
believes that his intended action will produce the effect of "destroy-
ing an enemy military target." He can in no way specifically determine
whether innocent civilians will be killed as a result of an action or
not. That is a matter of pure speculation for him. As a result, we
are in the peculiar position of having to say that his act is per-
missible, even though it might have the vilest of consequences, because
the lieutenant neither intends, nor foresees these evil consequences.
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, I find the PDE most unhelpful in many
situations where it is supposed to be of assistance. First, for the
PDE to be a viable doctrine one has to say that one's duty not to
perform harmful actions takes precedence over one's duty to perform
beneficial actions. At the very least, this is a notion very much
open to debate. If it is incorrect as I believe, then the PDE
collapses as a viable doctrine.
Second, there are many situations where the agent may formulate
a general intention in doing some action. The agent's view of the
situation, however, may be so loose and non-specific that any number
of actual situations can fulfill his expressed intention and fore-
sight. The question becomes whether the agent intends each and every
one of these state of affairs. I think not. Unfortunately, the PDE
does not give us strict enough criteria for how specific the agent's
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intention and foresight must be. As a result, it probably allows more
questionable intentional actions than it should because these actions
are couched in non-specific terms.
Finally, the PDF fails to help us with actions in which more than
one agent is involved. To apply the PDF, we must assume that we can
make sense of notions like the "intentions of corporate entities" and
intentional "chains-of-actions" where one agent has the overall
intention and foresight for the act which is to be judged, while
another agent actually performs the action. Once again, 1 find
both of these notions confusing.
The PDF is not a viable theory. The problem is not as some
philosophers have suggested, that is is unable to account for the
massive and indiscriminate effects of modern weapons; the problem
is that it is grounded in doubtful philosophical concepts. My
contention is, then, that the PDF has been incorrect and unhelpful
all along; we have just failed to understand that is so.
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,
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We could adjust this comment to also fit with the "multiplier"
position. While Goldman, for example, wants to claim that each act
properly exemplified by an agent at a time is a distinct act, he
allows for the intuitive unity between certain of his acts by means
of an "act-tree." It seems to me that to make the same point against
Goldman we just have to say that there is probably at least one act
on a particular act tree that has a property which we consider morally
bad
.
37
I am assuming here that Williams has made a reasonable effort
to take proper precautions against injuring innocent civilians. For
example, he should observe the target long enough to determine the
time when it would be least likely for him to fire and kill civilians
yet still destroy the target.
112
See Joseph Margolis
and International Affairs,
pp. 246-265.
"War and Ideology," Philos ophy. Morality
eds. Virginia Held, et al., (London, 1974),
Chapter IV
Some psychologists and philosophers have suggested that we
have "unconscious intentions" or intentions that we do not consciously
reflect on in some actions. Others have accounted for these actions
by saying that such activity is voluntary but non-intentional
. It
seems to me that the idea of intention revolves on the agent knowingly
willing his action. The term "unconscious intention" is, to me at
least, self-contradictory.
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I want to thank Gary Matthews for bringing this point to my
attention
.
See Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect," The Oxford Review
,
Vol. 5 (1967), pp. 10-14.
A number of interesting articles have been written on this
topic. If the reader is interested in pursuing this matter further,
then I suggest reading Bonnie Steinbock's anthology. Killing and
Letting Die
,
(Englewood Cliffs, 1980).
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We can see that the "problem of moral risk-taking" is relevant
to many major decisions in combat. Most people recognize, for example,
the Normandy Invasion as a great turning point in World War II. Great
good was brought about by this action (i.e., a much earlier end to the
war in Europe, etc.) and yet tremendous risks were also taken. Had the
allies not been successful many soldiers on both sides would have died
needlessly and perhaps the Nazis would have been able to continue with
their many nefarious projects.
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Joseph Margolis, "War and Ideology," Philosophy, Morality and
International Affairs
,
eds. Virginia Held et al., (London, 1974), p. 255.
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